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*****
INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that the United States of America vigorously
opposes the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the ICC
Prosecutor’s claims that the ICC has authority to investigate and try
nationals of non-party States without the States’ consent. The
position of the United States is based primarily and firmly on the
customary international law principle that “[a] treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”1

of Science (B.S.) degree from the United States Military Academy at West
Point, New York; his Master of International Public Policy (M.I.P.P.)
degree from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC; and his Juris Doctor (J.D.)
degree (cum laude) from the Regent University School of Law, Virginia
Beach, Virginia. During his Army career, Mr. Ash was a George and Carol
Olmsted Scholar who studied two years at the University of Zurich, in
Zurich, Switzerland. He also served as a Congressional Fellow for one year
in the office of Senator John McCain of Arizona. Mr. Ash has taught
international law and national security law courses at the Regent University
School of Law, and he currently heads the national security practice of the
ACLJ.
1
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. Article 34 simply incorporates the customary law principle
into the treaty. This is a common practice, and doing so does not remove
the principle from customary international law, although it does make it part
of binding conventional law for those States which are a party to the treaty
which incorporates the customary law principle. As such, those States that
have acceded to the Vienna Convention are bound by both conventional and
customary law regarding that principle. Ninety-one States Parties to the
Rome Statute are also signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Hence, those ninety-one States are doubly bound. They are bound
by the principle as customary international law, and they have consented to
be bound by the identical principle as conventional international law.
Accordingly, States Parties to both treaties violated their solemn obligations
under both customary and conventional international law when they
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The United States, having declined to accede to the Rome Statute,2
is just such a “third State” vis-à-vis the Rome Statute and its terms.
Accordingly, having rejected the treaty in its entirety,3 the United
States, pursuant to customary international law, strongly asserts that
without its prior consent, the United States is free of any obligations
set forth in the Rome Statute as well as any interaction with any
organ created by the treaty.4 Moreover, no third State or group of
States may waive or modify by treaty the sovereign rights of the
United States vis-à-vis its nationals, territory, or actions without its
consent. Finally, no third State or group of States may waive or
modify by treaty any other rights enjoyed by the United States under
customary international law without its consent.5
Despite the unambiguous international law principle that
treaties do not bind non-party States, the ICC Office of the

included Article 12(2)(a) in the Rome Statute, which disregards the right of
non-party States to a treaty to be free of any obligations set forth in such
treaty without their prior consent. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court art. 12(2)(a), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Secretary Rumsfeld Statement
on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Statement on the
ICC Treaty], https://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=
3337 (announcing that the United States will not become a party to the ICC
treaty and is effectively withdrawing from signatory status); see also Speech
Transcript: John Bolton on U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal
Court, EPOCH TIMES, Sept. 10, 2018 [hereinafter Bolton Speech Transcript],
https://www.theepochtimes.com/speech-transcript-john-bolton-on-u-spolicy-toward-the-international-criminal-court_2656808.html.
3
Having declined to ratify the treaty, the treaty’s terms do not
apply to the United States. Hence, when a State rejects a treaty like the
Rome Statute, it rejects the treaty “in its entirety” (save only for any terms
of customary international law contained therein, provided the rejecting
State was not a persistent objector as such custom developed).
4
See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34; see also Bolton
Speech Transcript, supra note 2.
5
Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy:
The Rome Statute’s Unlawful Application to Non-State Parties, 44 VA. J.
INT’L L. 63, 66–68 (2003).
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Prosecutor (OTP) is nonetheless asserting its jurisdictional reach
over nationals of non-party States to the Rome Statute without
obtaining the prior consent of an accused’s State of nationality.
Among the nationals over whom the OTP is currently seeking to
assert its jurisdiction are nationals of the United States of America.6
This explains the vigorous pushback by officials of the United States
Government.

6
See, e.g., Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC02/17-33, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan, ¶¶ 23–24, 43–66 (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF. The ICC Prosecutor’s attempt
to ensnare nationals of non-consenting, non-party States to the Rome
Statute is not limited to nationals of the United States. Two other examples
quickly come to mind, to wit, the OTP’s attempts to assert its jurisdiction
over nationals of Myanmar and Israel, see Situation in the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19,
Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ¶¶ 72–
84 (July 4, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_
03510.PDF; Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2018; ICCOTP, ¶¶ 251–84 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/
181205-rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf, both of which, like the United States, have
declined to accede to the Rome Statute and do not recognize or consent to
ICC jurisdiction over their nationals. Moreover, it is not just the United
States that objects to the Rome Statute’s jurisdictional regime under Article
12(2)(a). Other States also strenuously object. See, e.g., Lu Jianping &
Wang Zhixiang, China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
608, 608 (2005) (noting China’s objection that the ICC’s “jurisdiction is not
based on the principle of voluntary acceptance” and that “complementarity
gives the ICC the power to judge whether a state is able or willing to conduct
proper trials of its own nationals”); Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of
India, Explanation of Vote on the Adoption of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), https://www.legaltools.org/doc/9f86d4/pdf/ (“It is truly unfortunate that a Statute drafted for
an institution to defend the law should start out straying so sharply from
established international law. Before it tries its first criminal, the ICC would
have claimed a victim of its own—the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.”).
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In an article7 widely acclaimed by proponents of broad ICC
jurisdiction,8 Professor Dapo Akande supports the view that custom
has developed to the point where a treaty-based court like the ICC
may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States in
certain circumstances. He does so by arguing the following four
points.
First, in order to circumvent the customary rule that treaties do
not bind non-party States, he differentiates between a “State” and its
“nationals.”9 He claims that non-party States have no obligations
under the Rome Statute, whereas, a State’s nationals may be subject
to ICC jurisdiction under certain circumstances. Yet, because a State
is never distinct from its nationals or territory (both of which are
elements that constitute a State), the State-vs-nationals distinction is
simply contrived, irreparably flawed, and, hence, inapt as
justification for expanded ICC jurisdiction.10

7

Dapo Akande, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits, 1 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 618 (2003).
8
See, e.g., Observations Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, Amicus Curiae, ¶ 22 &
n.27 (June 18, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_
03130.PDF (citing Akande, supra note 7) (“The delegated-jurisdiction
theory supports the ICC’s jurisdiction over nationals of nonparty States,
which can occur inter alia in cases of objective territoriality such as in the
circumstances giving rise to the Prosecutor’s Request.”); Prosecutor v.
Omar Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Prosecution Response to the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s Appeal, ¶ 43 & n.67 (Apr. 3, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_01918.PDF
(citing
Akande, supra note 7) (explaining that Article 98 of the Rome Statute was
meant “to ensure that a State Party would not become subject to competing
obligations under international law”).
9
Akande, supra note 7, at 620–21, 634–37.
10
It is critical to understand whether such a distinction has any
substance because the OTP relies heavily on it as justification to bring
within the ICC’s ambit nationals of non-party States accused of committing
crimes laid out in the Rome Statute. In fact, the OTP is already acting on it.
See, e.g., Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and
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Second, Professor Akande asserts that, because States routinely
“delegate” part of their criminal jurisdiction to other States under
what he dubs collectively as “anti-terrorism treaties,” precedent is
sufficiently established for States to do the same with respect to the
ICC. Yet, as discussed infra, the anti-terrorism treaties to which he
refers only govern interactions between States Parties to those
treaties, not interactions with non-party States or treaty-created
criminal tribunals. Further, no “delegation” of jurisdiction actually
occurs because, based on the sovereign equality of States, all States
possess equal, inherent authority to act in such circumstances,
making delegation wholly unnecessary.11 As such, the anti-terrorism
treaties do not support the ICC’s jurisdictional regime.
Third, Professor Akande asserts that prosecuting States are not
required to obtain the consent of the accused’s State of nationality
under the anti-terrorism treaties. While this statement is certainly
true with respect to States, any argument that the same should apply
to treaty-based criminal courts is false.
Fourth, Professor Akande asserts that there is a long line of
precedents whereby treaty-based international criminal courts have
exercised jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States without the
consent of the accused’s State of nationality.12 Such practice, he
claims, has crystallized into custom. None of the examples Professor
Akande provided, however, stands for such a proposition. There is
no evidence whatsoever that, historically, international criminal

Cambodia, Article 53(1) Report, ICC-OTP, ¶ 14 (Nov. 6, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-COM-Article_53(1)-Report06Nov2014Eng.pdf (justifying jurisdiction over nationals of Israel, a nonconsenting, non-party State, by concluding that although “Israel is not a
State Party, according to Article 12(2)(a) of the Statute, the ICC can
exercise its jurisdiction in relation to the conduct of non-party State
nationals alleged to have committed Rome Statute crimes on the territory
of, or on vessels and aircraft registered in, an ICC State Party” (emphasis
added)).
11
See infra Section V.A.1 for a detailed discussion of the delegation
theory.
12
Akande, supra note 7, at 627–33.
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courts have been permitted to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of
non-consenting, non-party States, absent the involvement of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
We assert that any attempt by the OTP, the ICC, or any ICC
chamber of judges to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of the
United States under Article 12(2)(a): (1) violates the well-settled
customary international law principle that “[a] treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent”13;
(2) infringes on the sovereign right of the United States to reject in
toto a treaty, thereby exempting its nationals, its territory, and its
actions from the reach and effects of such treaty; and (3) is,
therefore, ipso facto illegal. Additionally, asserting ICC jurisdiction
may also violate well-established and longstanding customary
international law provisions dealing with legal immunities.14

13

Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute violates, for example, the
Convention on Special Missions art. 21, June 21, 1985, 1400 U.N.T.S. 231
(“The Head of the sending State, when he leads a special mission, shall
enjoy in the receiving State or in a third State the facilities, privileges and
immunities accorded by international law to Heads of State on an official
visit.”); see also Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents art.
1(1), Feb. 20, 1977, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (“‘Internationally protected person’
means: (a) [a] Head of State, including any member of a collegial body
performing the functions of a Head of State under the constitution of the
State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs,
whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his
family who accompany him; (b) [a]ny representative or official of a State
or any official or other agent of an international organization of an
intergovernmental character who, at the time when and in the place where
a crime against him, his official premises, his private accommodation or his
means of transport is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to
special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as well
as members of his family forming part of his household.”). These United
Nations conventions recognize long-standing, generally accepted legal
immunities under customary international law and “[a]ffirm[] that the rules
of customary international law continue to govern questions not regulated
by the provisions of the present Convention.” Convention on Special
Missions, supra, at Preamble.
14
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In Section I, we give a general overview of applicable
international law, including sources of international law,
particularly as they pertain to custom and convention. In Section II,
we discuss the law that governs the Rome Statute. In Section III, we
discuss the United States’ objections to the Rome Statute’s
application to the United States and its nationals. Specifically,
Section III shows how Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute violates
customary international law, the sovereignty of non-party States,
and the principle of sovereign equality of States. Further, this section
points out the fundamental flaw in Professor Akande’s State-vsnationals distinction as well as flaws in the exemptions that the
Rome Statute permitted for nationals of its States Parties. In Section
IV, we begin reviewing and responding to Professor Akande’s claim
that custom has developed to the point whereby a treaty-based
international criminal court may assert jurisdiction over nationals of
non-consenting, non-party States in certain circumstances. Section
V reviews the examples Professor Akande has given that he claims
provide evidence of the alleged custom. First, this section discusses
what he calls the “anti-terrorism” treaties and delegation of
jurisdiction from one State to another under them. Second, this
section discusses U.S. cases that Professor Akande claims indicate
that even the United States agrees—by practice—with prosecuting
foreign nationals without the consent of the State of their nationality
when they can establish jurisdiction under rules of customary
international law. We explain why these cases lend no support for
the ICC’s basis of jurisdiction because States are generally not
required to obtain consent of the accused’s State of nationality
because in such cases jurisdiction is established under rules of
customary international law. Finally, this section discusses each
international tribunal that Professor Akande believes provides
precedent for trying accused before international criminal tribunals
without the consent of the accused’s State of nationality. None of
the tribunals stands for such a principle. In fact, many of these
tribunals confirm the opposite, to wit, that to be legitimate,
jurisdiction of international criminal courts must be consent-based.

I.

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE
INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law can be defined as “the system of rules,
principles, and processes intended to govern relations at the
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interstate level, including the relations among states, organizations,
and individuals.”15 Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) lists three primary and several secondary
sources of international law.16 The three primary sources are: (1)
“international conventions . . . establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states”17 (commonly referred to as
“conventional international law” and generally binding18 on the
parties to the respective convention); (2) “international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”19 (commonly

15
MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2010).
16
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
17
Id. at art. 38(1)(a) (emphasis added). Note especially the phrase,
“establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.” Such
rules need not be recognized by States which are not parties to the
convention. Some jurists have even questioned whether treaties should even
be considered as a source of international law. Sir Gerald “Fitzmaurice, for
example, has [opined] that ‘treaties are no more a source of law than an
ordinary private law contract that creates rights and obligations . . . . In itself,
the treaty and “the law” it contains only applies [sic] to the parties to it.’”
LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (3d
ed. 1993) (quoting Gerald Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the
Formal Sources of International Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL at 153, 157–
58 (Von Asbeck et al. eds., 1958)).
18
We say “generally binding” because many international treaties
permit States to accede with specific reservations or understandings that
may limit how the treaty is applied to such States. The theory behind
permitting such reservations is that it is better for a large number of States
to agree to most of the terms of a treaty than for very few States to agree
entirely with a treaty.
19
ICJ Statute, supra note 16, at art. 38(1)(b). “The view of most
international lawyers is that customary law is not a form of tacit treaty but
an independent form of law; and that, when a custom satisfying the
definition in Article 38 is established, it constitutes a general rule of
international law which, subject to one reservation, applies to every state.”
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 87. That “one reservation” applies to the “State
which, while the custom is in process of formation, unambiguously and
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referred to as “customary international law” and generally binding20
on all nations); and (3) “the general principles of law recognized by

persistently registers its objection to the recognition of the practice as law.”
Id.
20
Here, we say “generally binding” because a State may opt out of
a customary law principle if it had been a persistent objector while the
custom was in the process of formation. HENKIN, supra note 17, at 87.
Regarding the Rome Statute, we assert that the actions taken by the United
States Government vis-à-vis the ICC constitute evidence of persistent
objection thereto. For the continuing forceful U.S. response to the ICC, see,
e.g., Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty, supra note 2; Is a U.N.
International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, 105th Cong. 13 (1998) [hereinafter
Scheffer
Testimony],
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG105shrg50976/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50976.pdf (noting testimony from the
Honorable David Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues)
(“[T]he [Rome Statute] purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S.
armed forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the
international court even if the United States has not agreed to be bound by
the treaty . . . . [T]his [is] contrary to the most fundamental principles of
treaty law . . . .”); President William J. Clinton, Statement on the Rome
Treaty on the International Criminal Court, Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 4
(Dec. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Clinton Statement on the Rome Treaty],
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-2001-01-08/pdf/WCPD2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf (“In particular, we are concerned that when the court
comes into existence, it will not only exercise authority over personnel of
states that have ratified the treaty but also claim jurisdiction over personnel
of states that have not.”); Brett D. Schaefer, Beating the ICC, HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Feb.
18,
2013),
https://www.heritage.org/globalpolitics/commentary/beating-the-icc (noting the consistency of U.S. policy
toward the ICC irrespective of which Party is occupying the White House);
and Bolton Speech Transcript, supra note 2, reflects persistent objection by
the United States Government to the increasing role played by international
courts like the ICC as well as to their claim that they may exercise
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals without the prior consent of the United
States.
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civilized nations.”21 Secondary sources of international law include
“judicial decisions,” “teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations,”22 as well as principles of equity
and fairness.23 For purposes of this analysis, we will focus primarily
on the relationship and interaction between conventional
international law and customary international law as they apply to
the jurisdictional reach of treaty-based, international criminal
courts on nationals of non-consenting, non-party States.
Conventional international law is found in conventions, treaties,
and similar negotiated agreements between and among States as
well as agreements between States and other international actors
(like the United Nations or NATO), and it is only binding on the
parties to such agreements.24 Accordingly, it is a consent-based legal
regime. Customary international law, on the other hand, is law based
on custom that develops over an extended period of time and is
considered binding on all States.25 Although it is not necessarily
written law, customary international law is nonetheless considered

21

ICJ Statute, supra note 16, at art. 38(1)(c); see also O’CONNELL,
supra note 15, at 60. These include common principles of law and justice
reflected in the legal systems of civilized States.
22
ICJ Statute, supra note 16, at art. 38(1)(d). Louis Henkin aptly
notes that
[t]he place of the writer in international law has always been
more important than in municipal legal systems. The basic
systematization of international law is largely the work of
publicists, from Grotius and Gentilis onwards . . . . In the [civil
law] systems reference to textbook writers and commentators is a
normal practice, as the perusal of any collection of decisions of
the German, Swiss or other European Supreme Courts will show.
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 123.
23
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 113.
24
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
25
There is one notable exception. A State may exempt itself from
an international custom if that State is a “persistent objector” during the
period of time that the custom develops. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati,
Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204–05, 211
(2010).
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“law” because States generally comply with its requirements
because they believe that they have a legal obligation to do so.26 “To
establish a rule of customary international law, State practice has to
be virtually uniform, extensive and representative.”27 We would
point out that this is not the case with the Rome Statute. Although
approximately two-thirds of all States have acceded to the treaty,
one-third of all States—including three permanent members of the
UNSC—representing two-thirds of the globe’s population have
not.28 It is difficult to understand how such statistics support

26

See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) (“The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence
of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many
international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are
performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense
of legal duty.”). In that sense, customary international law differs from
customary usage (such as ceremonial salutes at sea or exempting diplomatic
vehicles from certain parking regulations), since States recognize no legal
obligation to do the latter.
27
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS,
ACTORS, AND PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 78 (3rd ed.
2010).
28
The United States Department of State recognizes the existence
of 195 independent States. Independent States in the World Fact Sheet, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/independent-states-in-the-world/. Of these, 123
States are parties to the Rome Statute. Status of Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 2, 2020),
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en. Although 63.08% (or just under 2/3) of
the world’s States have acceded to the ICC, they account for just under 1/3
of the world’s population. The global population in July 2018 was estimated
to be 7,503,828,180. Central Intelligence Agency, World, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/xx.html. Non-party States to the Rome Statute include
the following (with estimated population in parentheses): China
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“virtually uniform, extensive and representative” State practice.
Further, “[n]ot all state practice results in customary law . . . .
Consistent state practice becomes law when states follow the
practice out of a sense of legal obligation encapsulated in the phrase
opinio juris sive necessitatis.”29

II. LAW GOVERNING THE ROME STATUTE
All treaties, including the Rome Statute, are governed by
general principles of international law. That “[a] treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent”30 is an example of such a principle. While the relationship
between States Parties to a treaty is governed by the express terms
of the respective treaty, the relationship between States Parties and
non-party States is governed by general principles of customary
international law. Further, although States are free to modify custom
inter se by entering into treaties, they lack authority to modify

(1,394,015,977), India (1,326,093,247), the United States (332,639,102),
Indonesia (267,026,366), Pakistan (233,500,636), Russia (141,722,205),
the Philippines (109,180,815), Ethiopia (108,113,150), Egypt
(104,124,440), Vietnam (98,721,275), Iran (84,923,314), Turkey
(82,017,514), Thailand (68,977,400), Burma/Myanmar (56,590,071),
Sudan (45,561,556), Ukraine (43,922,939), Algeria (42,972,878), Iraq
(38,872,655), Saudi Arabia (34,173,498), Angola (32,522,339), Uzbekistan
(30,565,411), Nepal (30,327,877), Mozambique (30,098,197), Yemen
(29,884,405), North Korea (25,643,466), Taiwan (23,603,049), Sri Lanka
(22,889,201), Kazakhstan (19,091,949), Zimbabwe (14,546,314), Rwanda
(12,712,431), Burundi (11,865,821), Somalia (11,757,124), Cuba
(11,059,062), South Sudan (10,561,244), Azerbaijan (10,205,810), United
Arab Emirates (9,992,083), Belarus (9,477,918), Israel (8,675,475), Togo
(8,608,444), Laos (7,447,369), Papua New Guinea (7,259,456), Libya
(6,890,535), Nicaragua (6,203,441), Eritrea (6,081,196), Kyrgyzstan
(5,964,897), Turkmenistan (5,528,627), Oman (4,664,844), Mauritania
(4,005,475), and Kuwait (2,993,706). This totals to 5,034,276,204 or
67.09% (just over 2/3) of the world’s population.
29
DUNOFF, supra note 27 at 79.
30
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
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custom for third States not party to the treaty.31 Because the ICC is
a creation of a treaty, it is subject to these general principles.32 As
such, the relationship between States Parties to the Rome Statute is
governed by the terms of the Rome Statute, whereas the relationship
between States Parties to the Rome Statute and non-party States is
governed by general principles of customary international law.
Although it is true that principles enshrined in a treaty may
evolve into custom over time if non-party States to the respective
treaty begin to conform their activities to such principles because
they believe they have a legal obligation to do so,33 that has not
occurred with respect to the various elements of the Rome Statute
(such as Articles 12(2)(a) and 27), as evidenced by the significant
number of States rejecting the ICC as well as the continuing
criticism lodged against the court and its actions by non-party
States.34

31

There can be an exception here, too. Principles enshrined in
treaties may evolve into custom over time if non-party States to the
respective treaty begin to conform their activities to such principles because
they believe that they have a legal obligation to do so. North Sea Continental
Shelf, supra note 26, ¶ 71.
32
See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 1.
33
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 26, ¶ 71.
34
Such States include China, see Jianping, China’s Attitude
Towards the ICC, supra note 6, at 608 (“While some of those who failed to
vote or voted against the Rome Statute in July 1998 eventually signed
before the deadline, China has never changed its stance.”); Dan Zhu, China,
The International Criminal Court, And Global Governance, AUSTRALIAN
OUTLOOK (Jan. 10, 2020), http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australian
outlook/china-the-international-criminal-court-and-global-governance/
(“In fact, China has been particularly concerned about the ICC’s potential
interference in its policy and ability to address possible recurrences of
extremist, separatist and terrorist violence in Xinjiang and Tibet provinces,
which it deems as purely internal affairs and hence not subject to
international scrutiny.”), and India, see Lahiri, supra note 6 (“[T]he scope
of the Statute has been broadened so much that it could be misused for
political purposes or through misplaced zeal, to address situations and cases
for which the ICC was not intended, and where, as a matter of principle, it
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Despite such ongoing criticism of the ICC by non-party States,
Professor Akande nonetheless claims that there has been sufficient
State practice to establish that treaty-based international criminal
courts may lawfully exercise jurisdiction over nationals of nonconsenting, non-party States in certain circumstances. From that
questionable claim, he concludes that Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome
Statute (that allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over nationals
of non-consenting, non-party States in certain circumstances)
reflects a rule that has developed into a custom by virtue of such
State practice. If, as he claims, such a custom has indeed
crystallized, one would then be justified in concluding that the
principle that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent”35 no longer governs and the
jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals (like the ICC) may
now be exercised over nationals of non-consenting, non-party
States.
Yet, as one examines the evidence proffered by Professor
Akande to support his thesis, one can quickly see that he utterly fails
to establish what he claims.36 Professor Akande resorts to sleights
of hand and leaps of logic to make his case. No customary rule has
crystallized to contradict the principle that “[a] treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent,”37
and the regime under Article 12(2)(a) that claims jurisdiction over
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States wholly contradicts
existing norms of customary international law.

should not intrude.”); Kiran Menon, Asia and the ICC: 20 Years Later, THE
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 13, 2018) https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/asia-and-theicc-20-years-later/ (“The possibility that historically delicate and
contentious conflicts in various internal regions especially in Kashmir and
various northeastern states could be examined and investigated, has led to
opposition [particularly to Article 8] from the Indian political sphere.”).
35
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
36
See Section V.B. for detailed discussion.
37
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
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III. THE RATIONALE FOR U.S. OBJECTIONS TO THE
ICC’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER ITS
NATIONALS WITHOUT ITS CONSENT
The United States has made its objections to the Rome Statute
and the ICC abundantly clear.38 U.S. objections have also been
persistent over time39 and were recently reiterated by U.S.

38
See supra note 20. It is noteworthy that the United States’ position
has been consistent over time and indicates that the United States is a
vigorous and persistent objector to the Rome Statute and its terms. Id.
Accordingly, even if international custom were developing vis-à-vis ICC
expansion of jurisdiction to include nationals of non-consenting, third-party
States (which we believe to be wrong in fact and questionable at best), the
United States would nevertheless not be governed by such custom in light
of its persistent objection thereto ever since the language of Rome Statute
was approved and the custom was in “development.”
39
Less than a month before President Clinton was to leave office,
he issued what can best be described as a tepid endorsement of the ICC.
Clinton Statement on the Rome Treaty, supra note 20. In his signing
statement, President Clinton confirmed strong, historic U.S. support for the
ideal of international accountability for the perpetrators of the most heinous
international crimes even as he catalogued significant flaws in the Rome
Statute, including, but not limited to, the ICC’s projected violation of
customary international law by claiming jurisdiction over nationals of
States that had not ratified the treaty. The President noted that ICC
“jurisdiction over U.S. personnel should come only after U.S. ratification of
the treaty,” id., —to wit, only with explicit, prior, U.S. consent, a concept
well-established in customary international law. See, e.g., Vienna
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. Further, in light of significant U.S.
concerns about the treaty, President Clinton declared: “I will not, and do not
recommend that my successor submit the treaty to the Senate for advice and
consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.” Clinton Statement on
the Rome Treaty, supra note 20. Declining to submit the treaty to the Senate
is significant. President Clinton was well aware that the United States
Senate was on record opposing the treaty as drafted. See, e.g., The Future
of U.S.–U.N. Relations: A Dialogue Between the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the U.N. Security Council: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations (2000) (statement of Jesse Helms, Chairman,
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Ambassador John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to the
President of the United States, in a speech he delivered before the
Federalist Society.40 It is significant that the Congress of the United
States fully agrees with the Executive Branch on this issue and has,
accordingly, enacted legislation to protect U.S. military personnel
from, and to forbid U.S. cooperation with, the ICC, its officials, and
its organs.41 The ICC’s decision to breach a long-standing

S. Comm. on Foreign Relations), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CHRG-106shrg62154/pdf/CHRG-106shrg62154.pdf. It would have been
impossible for the Senate to ratify the treaty without significant
amendments which other States were unwilling to entertain.
Hence, despite the active participation by U.S. officials in attempting
to draft a treaty that would create an international criminal court to achieve
the laudable goal of bringing to justice perpetrators of the most heinous
international crimes, the United States Government ultimately concluded
that the ICC was not such a court, that U.S. officials could not trust the court
as constituted to administer the required level of justice acceptable to the
United States. President Clinton’s statement confirms the U.S. view that the
ICC falls far short of acceptable standards even as he expressed hope that
such shortcomings might one day be corrected. Since President Clinton’s
stated rationale for signing the Rome Treaty was “to remain engaged in
making the ICC an instrument of impartial and effective justice,” Clinton
Statement on the Rome Treaty, supra note 20, it is difficult to argue
seriously that the United States has not been a persistent objector vis-à-vis
the Rome Statute from the point where the treaty’s text had been fixed and
approved by the majority of States voting for the treaty.
The true (and continuing) position of the United States was confirmed
on May 6, 2002, when the incoming Bush Administration moved to
“unsign” the treaty and to make known its unwavering objections to the ICC
as constituted as well as to the ICC’s claim to be able to assert and exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States, like the
United States. Press Release, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of
State, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan (May 6, 2002), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/
9968.htm.
40
Bolton Speech Transcript, supra note 2.
41
See, e.g., American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 7401, 7421, 7423 (2002). International law attorneys Steven Kay and
Joshua Kern, in their recent Article 15 Communication to the ICC, correctly
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customary law norm by unlawfully exercising jurisdiction without
the consent of the non-party States (e.g., by applying the Rome
Statute to nationals of non-consenting, non-party States) has already
prompted the United States to initiate protective measures against
the ICC’s unlawful acts.42

A. ARTICLE 12(2)(A) OF THE ROME STATUTE, WHICH
SANCTIONS THE ICC’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
OVER NATIONALS OF NON-CONSENTING, NON-PARTY
STATES, VIOLATES CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The current position of the United States vis-à-vis the Rome
Statute and the ICC could not be clearer—absent specific sanction
by the UNSC43 or explicit consent by appropriate officials of the

state that continuing the wrongful pursuit of non-consenting, non-party
State nationals could inevitably lead to “acts of retorsion and
countermeasures.” Steven Kay & Joshua Kern, Article 15 Communication:
Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-States
Parties, ¶ 4 (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.9bedfordrow.co.uk/media/1303/
190819_art-15-communication_icc_nsp_9br.pdf.
42
See American Service-Members’ Protection Act, supra note 41.
See also Marlise Simons & Megan Specia, U.S. Revokes Visa of I.C.C.
Prosecutor Pursuing Afghan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/05/world/europe/us-icc-prosecutorafghanistan.html.
43
Note that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referrals,
when they occur, are based on the UNSC’s authority under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter. In other words, Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, does not
“authorize” the UNSC to issue a referral. The Rome Statute has no authority
over the UN since the UN is not a State. The UN Charter allows the UNSC
to establish international criminal tribunals. If it chooses to refer a matter to
the ICC instead of establishing an ad hoc tribunal, that does not establish
jurisdiction under the Rome Statute, but rather pursuant to the UN Charter.
In effect, the UNSC is simply incorporating by reference the ICC, thereby
“converting” the ICC into a quasi-UNSC tribunal. Hence, the United States’
support of the UNSC’s referring a matter to the ICC is based on authority
under the UN Charter, not on authority from the Rome Statute. Moreover,
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United States Government, pursuant to customary international law,
the ICC has no legal right or authority to investigate and/or to try
any U.S. national for alleged commission in any place of any of the
crimes listed in the Rome Statute.44 We also believe that States
Parties to the Rome Statute, which are also States Parties to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),
are also bound under conventional international law to support the
position of the United States regarding the ICC and its claimed
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals.45 Accordingly, in order for the
Rome Statute to be in accord with customary international law,
Article 12(2)(a) would have to be understood to apply only to
nationals of States Parties to the Rome Statute and to nationals of
non-party States that otherwise expressly consent to ICC
jurisdiction.
Rather than be governed by terms in the Rome Statute found to
be unacceptable, non-consenting States, like the United States of
America, opt instead to be governed by applicable principles of
customary international law—as is their right. Under customary
international law, no other State or international organization (like
the ICC) established by other States has the right or the authority to
overrule or circumvent the sovereign decision of the United States

since State membership in the UN is almost universal, in the vast majority
of instances, jurisdiction would be ipso facto consent-based.
44
This does not mean that the United States does not recognize the
right of foreign States to investigate and try U.S. nationals for heinous
crimes committed on their soil in their domestic criminal courts as is
sanctioned under customary international law. It only means that the United
States does not concur in having its nationals transferred to or tried by an
international court (like the ICC) which the United States Government has
found wanting and has rejected, as is its right under customary international
law with respect to treaties.
45
See Rome Statute, supra note 1. The principle governing relations
between a third-party State and a treaty to which it has not acceded is
governed by the general formula pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (“[a]
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
consent”). Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. The foregoing
principle is central in State practice and is well-established in custom.
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to keep its nationals wholly outside such treaty regime. Any attempt
to do so is ipso facto unlawful and a violation of the very rule of law
that ICC proponents purportedly seek to uphold and enhance
internationally. It is indeed strange to suggest that one may willynilly violate unambiguous, long-standing customary international
law principles simply to achieve otherwise desirable ends.46 This
point was made powerfully by the representative of India when he
declared India’s opposition to the ICC: “It is truly unfortunate that a
Statute drafted for an institution to defend the law should start out
straying so sharply from established international law. Before it tries
its first criminal, the ICC would have claimed a victim of its own—
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”47 Violating contrary
unambiguous customary international law has been, and remains, a
dangerous path to pursue as it elevates subjective desires for results
(no matter how noble and desirable they appear to be) over wellestablished, internationally-recognized principles of customary

46

As Sir William Scott of the British High Court of Admiralty noted
long ago with respect to the slave trade in The Louis case,
[t]he great object [to halt the slave trade], therefore, ought to
be to obtain the concurrence of other nations, by application, by
remonstrance, by example, by every peaceable instrument which
men can employ to attract the consent of men. But a nation is not
justified in assuming rights that do not belong to her, merely
because she means to apply them to a laudable purpose.
Report of the Committee to Which Was Referred So Much of the
President’s Message as Relates to the Slave Trade, H.R. REP. NO. 16–59, at
13. (2d Sess. 1821), reprinted in Samuel J. May Anti-Slavery Collection
(emphasis added), http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pagevieweridx?c=mayantislavery&cc=mayantislavery&idno=28893024&view=imag
e&seq=13&size=100. The same is true of an international criminal court
today. Just because the court’s purpose is laudable does not justify its
disregarding unambiguous, though contrary, principles of law. For a more
recent statement of the same sentiment, see infra note 47 and accompanying
text.
47
Lahiri, supra note 6. This is a strong statement which also refutes
the State-vs-nationals claim.
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international law. Such an approach subverts the international rule
of law and is unlawful ab initio.
Recognition of this principle is absolutely critical when
determining the legal reach of an institution like the ICC, an
institution created pursuant to the Rome Statute, a treaty recently
characterized by former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton
as rejected by “more than 70 nations, representing two-thirds of the
world’s population, and over 70% of the world’s armed forces . . .
.”48 The foregoing statistics are sufficient in and of themselves to
demonstrate that proponents of wide ICC jurisdiction have failed
magnificently to convince a significant number of key States that the
ICC may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States.49
This fact alone shows that no custom has formed that replaces or
even modifies the principle that “[a] treaty does not create either
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”50 In our
view, a major part of the problem with the ICC is that it is subject to
political manipulation and that it seeks to extend its jurisdiction by
unlawful means, one of the most obvious being its total disregard
for the sovereign rights of a non-party State to be wholly free from

48
Bolton Speech Transcript, supra note 2; see also DAVID HOILE,
JUSTICE DENIED: THE REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3
(2d ed. 2014) (“[Rome Statute] members represent less than one third of the
world’s population”); David Davenport, The New Diplomacy, HOOVER
INST.: POL’Y REV. (Dec. 1, 2002), https://www.hoover.org/research/newdiplomacy (noting the Rome Statute was imposed on the world “with less
than half its people in support,” thereby “undercut[ting] the very principles
for which [international] organizations [like the ICC] claim to stand”);
Lahiri, supra note 6 (“[I]t was odd . . . that the draft adopted a definition of
crimes against humanity with which the representatives of over half of
humanity did not agree. And now we are about to adopt a Statute to which
the Governments who represent two-thirds of humanity would not be a
party.”).
49
It is noteworthy that among the non-party States to the Rome
Statute are the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Syria,
Turkey, the DPRK, and Iran, to name but a few of the notable players in
international affairs.
50
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
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the provisions of a treaty rejected by the governing officials of that
State vis-à-vis its nationals, territory, and actions.
Recalling that customary international law is considered “law”
because States comply with its requirements because they believe
that they have a legal obligation to do so,51 the decision by a large
number of States to reject outright ICC authority over their nationals
refutes as a matter of both law and fact Professor Akande’s claims
that custom has developed to the point where a court like the ICC
can forego the consent of non-party States vis-à-vis the ICC’s
exercising jurisdiction over their nationals. As such, non-party
States in this matter clearly recognize no custom requiring their
nationals to submit to a treaty-based court that they have rejected.
Hence, absent clearly recognized “custom,” there is no legal
obligation for a non-party State’s nationals to submit, and no lawful
authority to compel submission. Moreover, there is ample reason to
resist institutions like the OTP, ICC, and the various chambers of
judges which violate well-established customary international law.
The Rome Statute exists solely because its States Parties have
negotiated and agreed to its terms. The claim that the ICC may
indeed exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, nonparty States is an open, notorious, and continuing violation of
customary international law. As UK attorneys Steven Kay and
Joshua Kern reminded the ICC in their Article 15 Communication,
“[p]rior to the Rome Conference, no norm of customary
international law had been developed permitting the exercise of
jurisdiction by an international criminal court over a national of a
non-consenting State absent an enabling decision of the Security
Council.”52 Nothing has changed in that regard. Such jurisdictional
regime had been proposed for the first time in the Rome Statute.
Indeed, this very issue was one of the points of contention during
the drafting of the Rome Statute, and many significant States in the
international community rejected provisions which contravened

51
52

See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 26, ¶ 77.
Kay & Kern, supra note 41, ¶ 48.
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well-established international legal norms.53 This explains in large
part why so many significant States have refused—and continue to
refuse—to accede to the treaty. It may also explain why some States
Parties have withdrawn,54 or are threatening to withdraw,55 from the
treaty. It certainly shows that no such custom has developed.

53
See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, Nov. 16, 2016,
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02
Bw/content/id/2523566 (“Unfortunately the Court failed to meet the
expectations to become a truly independent, authoritative international
tribunal . . . . The decision of the Russian Federation not to become a party
to the Rome Statute (to withdraw its signature from the Statute) entails legal
consequences provided for by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969.”); Ma Xinmin, Statement of the Chinese Observer
Delegation at the General Debate in the 16th Session of the Assembly of
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, 5, Dec. 1, 2017,
https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP-16-CHI.pdf (“It is
important for the Court to strictly follow the rules set out in the Rome
Statute in handling the relationship between the Rome Statute and general
international law. Regrettably, this is not the case in the past judicial
practice of the Court.”); Lahiri, supra note 6; Bolton Speech Transcript,
supra note 2; see generally David J. Scheffer, Developments in
International Criminal Law: The United States and the International
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12 (1999).
54
The following States have withdrawn: Burundi, see Agence
France-Presse, Burundi becomes first nation to leave international criminal
court, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/
law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-internationalcriminal-court; Russia, see Robbie Gramer, Why Russia Just Withdrew from
the ICC, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 16, 2016, 10:18 AM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/16/why-russia-just-withdrew-from-iccputin-treaty-ukraine-law/; and the Philippines, see Amy Gunia, The
Philippines Has Officially Left the International Criminal Court, TIME
(Mar.
18,
2019),
https://time.com/5553323/philippines-leavesinternational-criminal-court/.
55
The Gambia and South Africa also filed notices of withdrawal
from the ICC in 2016. See Gramer, supra note 54. The Gambia later revoked
its withdrawal after a change in administration, and South Africa’s
withdrawal was voided by a South African High Court, which held the move
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Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Professor Akande
were correct about the development of custom regarding ICC
jurisdiction, he nonetheless fails to acknowledge that the United
States has been a persistent objector to the Rome Statute as currently
written and to the creation of an international criminal court which
can reach nationals of non-party States without such States’
consent.56 As a persistent objector, the United States is not bound by
such alleged “custom.”

B. ARTICLE 12(2)(A) OF THE ROME STATUTE VIOLATES
BOTH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NON-PARTY STATES AS
WELL AS THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES
As the Supreme Court of the United States aptly noted almost
200 years ago in The Antelope case, “[n]o principle of general law
is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of
nations . . . . It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully
impose a rule on another . . . . [Further, a]s no nation can prescribe
a rule for others, none can make a law of nations.”57 One of the key
realities surrounding the doctrine of the sovereign equality of

“unconstitutional and invalid.” See Merrit Kennedy, Under New Leader,
Gambia Cancels Withdrawal From International Criminal Court, NPR
(Feb. 14, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/02/14/515219467/under-new-leader-gambia-cancelswithdrawal-from-international-criminal-court; Norimitsu Onishi, South
Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/africa/
south-africa-icc-withdrawal.html. Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and Namibia
have also threatened to withdraw from the court. Duane E. Omondi Gumba,
Will other African countries follow Burundi out of the ICC?, INST. FOR
SECURITY STUD. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/will-otherafrican-countries-follow-burundi-out-of-the-icc.
56
See supra notes 38–40.
57
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825). Although the
evolution of international human rights law is slowly chipping away at this
absolutist principle, it is questionable whether such ideals have developed
sufficiently to be recognized as custom. See infra note 58.
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nations is that “there is no international legislative power through
which one or more states may act collectively to impose their will,
or institutions, on the others.”58 That would apply to States Parties
to the Rome Statute as well.
In accordance with the principle of the sovereign equality of
States, no foreign State may legitimately dispute the sovereign right
of the United States to decide, as it has vis-à-vis application of the
terms of the Rome Statute to U.S. nationals. There is no principle in
international law that permits one State to modify or waive the
sovereign rights of another State with respect to acceding to or
rejecting a treaty. And, if no foreign State may do so, certainly no
non-sovereign, subordinate creation of a collection of foreign States
(like the OTP, the ICC, or the various ICC chambers of judges) may
do so (since any authority such entities exercise has been delegated
to them by the States Parties, and States Parties can only delegate
authority they lawfully possess,59 which excludes negating a third

58
Casey & Rivkin, supra note 5, at 67 (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL,
THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED IN
THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 11–12 (Luke
White ed., 1792)). Today there are certain fundamental rules which are
assumed to apply to all nations even within their borders, whether they like
it or not, even if they are not members of the UN—e.g., the prohibition of
genocide, mass atrocities that shock the human conscience, etc. although,
in practice, it is difficult to convince nations to risk the lives of their
nationals to halt such atrocities as they are transpiring. Contours of such
developing law are still imprecise and controversial, placing the claim of
custom in question.
59
As Messieurs Casey and Rivkin aptly note,
[t]he fundamental principle of par in parem non habet
jurisdiction[em], that “legal persons of equal standing cannot
have their disputes settled in the court of one of them,” undercuts
the ICC’s claims to jurisdiction over the nationals of non-state
parties, since that court’s power is dependent upon the legal
authority of the Rome Statute states parties.
Id. at 74 (emphasis added) (quoting IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 324 (4th ed. 1995)). This would apply here because
the ICC would, in effect, be the equivalent of a court of a State Party.
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State’s right to reject the Rome Statute in toto). Rejection of the
Rome Statute by the sovereign entity, the United States of America,
trumps any and all authority of inferior, non-sovereign entities like
the OTP, the ICC, or any ICC chamber of judges (established
pursuant to the terms of a treaty rejected by the United States) to
impose their will on the United States, its nationals, its territory, or
its actions.
Despite total rejection of the Rome Statute by the United States,
the ICC nonetheless claims that Article 12(2)(a) allows the court to
supersede the sovereign decision of the United States to free itself
and its nationals from the jurisdictional web of the ICC. In the U.S.
view, applying Article 12(2)(a) to U.S. nationals violates both U.S.
sovereignty and customary international law and is, therefore, void
ab initio regarding U.S. nationals. The mere threat of such unlawful
application has prodded the Congress of the United States to enact
legislation aimed to protect U.S. nationals from being unlawfully
forced to appear before the ICC.60 This demonstrates the firm
resolve of the United States to protect its legal interests, as set forth
in customary international law. Further attempts by the ICC to
ensnare U.S. nationals will doubtless trigger additional measures
aimed at the court and court officials to protect the sovereign
interests of the United States in protecting its nationals from a court,

Moreover, although some treaties suggest the possibility of criminal
enforcement via international tribunals, they nonetheless recognize the need
for consent. The Genocide Convention, for example, provides the
following:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of
the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted
its jurisdiction.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added).
60
See, e.g., American Service-Members’ Protection Act, supra note
41, § 7421.
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which, in its current state, the United States views as illegitimate and
severely (if not irredeemably) flawed.61 It is not beyond imagination
that the United States Congress could enact further legislation to
criminalize future attempts to subject U.S. nationals to ICC
jurisdiction if ICC officials continue to exceed their legitimate
authority and act unlawfully vis-à-vis U.S. nationals.
The United States has no objection to other States freely
subjecting their populations to the terms of such treaty (as is their
sovereign right under customary international law), provided that no
U.S. national is adversely affected thereby. In the U.S. view, being
compelled to appear before the ICC adversely affects U.S. nationals
because they would lose important protections based on comity and
the sovereign equality of States that exist when one State deals with
another State.62

C. PROFESSOR AKANDE’S “STATE-VS-NATIONALS”
DISTINCTION CREATES NO EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
OF CONSENT-BASED TREATY APPLICATION
In order to circumvent the rule that a treaty does not create
obligations for a State not a party to such treaty, Professor Akande
employs a verbal sleight of hand in an attempt to make his

61

See infra Section III.D. for a discussion of such flaws.
As the Supreme Court of the United States aptly noted in
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951), for example, States retain
an interest in what happens to their citizens even when outside their home
territory:
As an alien he retains a claim upon the state of his citizenship
to diplomatic intervention on his behalf, a patronage often of
considerable value. The state of origin of each of these aliens
could presently enter diplomatic remonstrance against these
deportations if they were inconsistent with international law, the
prevailing custom among nations or their own practices.
Id. at 585. The foregoing concerns State-to-State actions which are wholly
missing with respect to the ICC when a non-party State would have to deal
with a court it had rejected. This can have a significant, negative impact on
the rights of U.S. nationals hauled before the ICC.
62
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arguments stick. In answer to the assertion that the Rome Statute
violates the customary international law rights of non-party States,
Professor Akande claims that “there is no provision in the ICC
Statute that requires non-party states (as distinct from their
nationals) to perform or to refrain from performing any actions.”63
He states further that, “[t]o be sure, the prosecution of non-party
nationals might affect the interests of that non-party but this is not
the same as saying that obligations are imposed on the non-party.”64
That is simply not true legally, factually, or logically.
His “State-vs-nationals” distinction is a false dichotomy that
fails to acknowledge key realities: First, population is one of the
inherent elements that makes a State a State. As such, the phrase
“State obligation” in a treaty ipso facto includes obligation by its
nationals; Second, no “State” qua State is able to “perform or refrain
from performing” any act, meaning that every State action is
accomplished by real persons, usually officials of the State, acting
on behalf of that State’s people (i.e., its nationals), thereby
explaining why there are no requirements regarding action by a
“State” (as Professor Akande uses the term65) included in the Rome
Statute; Third, it is impossible to investigate and/or try a “State” qua
State (one may investigate and try only real persons, to wit,
nationals of such State); and Fourth, among the United States
Government’s responsibilities is its obligation to protect its people
(i.e., U.S. nationals) from, inter alia, actions in contravention of
customary international law by international actors (like the ICC)

63

Akande, supra note 7, at 620 (emphasis added).
Id.
65
Professor Akande discusses “State” as if a State were able to exist
as an independent entity wholly separate from its constituent parts, which
include its population (i.e., its nationals). See infra note 68 for
characteristics of a State. Since every State actor is a real person, we believe
that Professor Akande’s approach is irredeemably flawed fiction that cannot
serve as an adequate basis to justify violating well-established customary
international law principles applicable to States simply so that the ICC may
investigate and try nationals of non-consenting States not a party to the
Rome Statute.
64
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which claim treaty-based authority to violate the rights of American
nationals under international law. No sovereign State can—or
should—long tolerate such unlawful conduct directed against its
nationals and interests.
Accordingly, the claim that “there is no provision in the ICC
Statute that requires non-party states . . . to perform or to refrain
from performing any actions,”66 while literally true, is essentially
meaningless and intentionally misleading. There is a simple reason
why no obligations for non-party States (as Professor Akande uses
the term) were written into the Rome Statute—because the drafters
of the treaty clearly understood that no State qua State can “do” or
“perform” anything. Hence, including in a treaty provisions
prohibiting “States” from doing what they are wholly incapable of
doing in the first place would be ludicrous on its face, since only
real persons (i.e., the nationals of such States) can act. Further, the
very concept of a “State” necessarily includes real persons (i.e., its
nationals) as a constituent part; hence, no nationals, no State. It is as
simple as that. The “punish individuals, not States” argument is, in
reality, a contrived argument that seeks to sidestep the inconvenient
strictures of contrary customary international law in order to permit
the ICC to bring within its jurisdictional reach otherwise
unreachable persons.
Stated somewhat differently, the distinction is misleading
because when a “State” exercises its sovereign will regarding the
acceptance or rejection of a convention or treaty it is in reality
government officials of that State who are, in fact, acting as agents
on behalf of that State’s population—its nationals.67 To reiterate,

66

Akande, supra note 7, at 620.
The Rome Statute claims the right to subject the nationals of
third-party States who commit, or are alleged to have committed, Article 5
crimes in the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute to investigation
and/or trial by the ICC. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12(2)(a). Yet,
such a claim violates the right of that individual as determined by his State
of nationality not to be transferred to or be tried by a court whose
jurisdiction was created pursuant to a convention that his State of nationality
rejected. See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34. That does not
67
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one must recognize, for example, that the territorial entities we call
“Nigeria” or “Jordan” or “Canada” do not—and, indeed, cannot—
“do” anything. Only people from such entities—to wit, “Nigerians”
and “Jordanians” and “Canadians”—can act. Further, one cannot
haul “Nigeria” or “Jordan” or “Canada” before the bar of any court;
one can only haul “Nigerians” and “Jordanians” and “Canadians”
before such a court.
Hence, when the President of the United States and the United
States Congress speak on such issues, they are not speaking merely
on their own behalf but on behalf of the people (i.e., the nationals)
of the United States as a whole. Further, the use of the name of the
State—to wit, “the United States of America” or a shorter form like
“the United States” or “the U.S.”—is a convenient shorthand that
embodies all that a State is (which certainly includes its nationals68).
It is similar to using the phrase “the White House” as shorthand to
refer to members of the Trump Administration or “Wall Street” to
refer to the financial center of the United States. Yet, when one hears
a statement like “The White House announced today . . . ,” no one
believes or is suggesting that the literal building did anything.
Instead, it is understood that Administration officials said or did

mean that such an individual is not subject to investigation and trial; he may
be investigated and tried by the criminal courts of the State on whose
territory he allegedly committed the crime, a principle well-established in
customary international law and respected by the United States. What is
prohibited is his being turned over to a court created by a treaty to which
his State of nationality has refused to accede and whose very legitimacy and
authority his State of nationality does not—and does not have to—
recognize. No foreign State may lawfully change that decision, whether via
a treaty or any other means.
68
Recall that customary international law defines a State as having
the following four characteristics: “a) a permanent population; b) a defined
territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the
other states.” Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097; Alexandra Rickart, Emerging Issues: To Be or Not to
Be, That Is the Statehood Question, 3 UNIV. BALT. J. INT’L L. 145, 145 &
n.1 (2015) (“[The Montevideo Convention is] considered to be customary
international law that applies to all States.”). Note that three of the four
characteristics of a State require the existence of real persons (i.e., a
country’s “nationals”).
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something. The term “State” in agreements and treaties is used—
and is understood to be used—in a similar fashion. Hence, let’s not
give further credence to the easily refutable fiction that a “State”
exists—or can exist—separate from its “nationals.”
So, let’s be crystal clear. When one says that the United States
of America refuses to accede to the Rome Statute, what one actually
means is that officials of the United States, acting as agents on behalf
of, in the interests of, and in protection of, nationals of the United
States, have declined to subject the government, the people, the
territory, the interests, and the actions of the United States to the
jurisdiction of the ICC, an international criminal court created by
other States pursuant to a treaty intentionally rejected in its entirety
by U.S. officials. We do not think it could be any clearer.

D. THE ROME STATUTE ALSO PROVIDED EXEMPTIONS
FOR NATIONALS OF ITS STATES PARTIES WHILE
WITHHOLDING THEM FROM NATIONALS OF NONCONSENTING, NON-PARTY STATES
Even States Parties to the Rome Statute tacitly (if not overtly)
recognized that State action ineluctably involves a State’s
“nationals,” not a “State” itself. They did so when they intentionally
included provisions in the treaty which were designed to exempt
their own nationals from ICC jurisdiction in certain circumstances.
For example, according to the terms of the Rome Statute as drafted,
States Parties were permitted to elect the following exemptions for
their own nationals: First, each State upon acceding to the Rome
Statute could declare that the treaty would not apply to its territory
or nationals regarding war crimes for up to seven years from the
respective State’s date of accession69 and Second, a State Party
could limit ICC jurisdiction over its nationals by explicitly rejecting
the definition of aggression, once adopted, or any future
amendments to the other listed crimes.70 Were a State Party to reject

69
70

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 124.
Id. at art. 121(5).
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the definition of aggression or any amendment to other listed crimes,
that State Party (meaning its nationals) would not be answerable for
the crime of aggression at all or for the amended crimes; the State
Party’s nationals would remain answerable for the original crimes.
Once again, such exemptions protect State Party nationals, not
the “State” itself, since no State qua State can ever be hauled before
a court and no State qua State is capable of committing any criminal
offense.71 Hence, once again, Professor Akande’s “State-vsnationals” distinction is exposed for the contrivance it is—as even
the States Parties recognized when they included additional
protections for their own nationals as indicated above.
Now, if officials of the States Parties to the Rome Statute could
decide that it was wholly appropriate to exempt their own nationals
from provisions of the treaty they drafted, there is no principled
reason why non-party States could not decide to exempt their
nationals from the entire treaty (as customary international law
clearly allows). Pursuant to customary international law, declining
to accede to the Rome Statute frees the non-party State’s nationals
from being subject to ICC jurisdiction (absent proper UNSC
referral).

71
For example, when people spoke of punishing “Germany” for war
crimes and other offenses following World War II, it was German officials
who were brought before the bar, and it was German officials who suffered
punishment for various crimes. Germany as a State was punished only in
the sense that the German population in general suffered from the results of
its officials’ acts and ultimate surrender; to wit, the German people suffered
under foreign occupation and all that that entailed. The German “State” qua
State committed no crimes and could not be brought before the bar of any
court—only German nationals committed such crimes, and only German
nationals were tried and punished. The same could be said about dealing
with crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge in the former Democratic
Kampuchea. Only real persons committed crimes, and only real persons
could be tried and punished for them. Hence, all acts punishable by law
involve persons, not States per se. Even lawsuits filed against artificial
persons like corporations can only “punish” real persons, to wit, the
corporation’s officers, directors, and shareholders.
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Summarizing the above, the officials of the ICC have in effect
withheld from nationals of non-party States exemptions to which the
nationals of its States Parties are entitled (since such exemptions had
to be affirmatively sought by the States Parties). That produces a
truly bizarre and unjust result for any legal system. Not only did it
violate customary international law for a treaty-based criminal
court to apply the terms of the treaty that created it to the nationals
of a non-party State without that State’s prior consent, it also
violated the principles of equity and fundamental fairness to apply
the terms of such treaty more harshly to the nationals of States
that rejected the treaty altogether than to the nationals of the
treaty’s States Parties.
Accordingly, the Rome Statute is a significantly flawed
instrument (as confirmed, inter alia, by the fact that approximately
one-third of all States, including a significant number of recognized
world and regional powers representing two-thirds of the world’s
population, have, in fact, rejected the treaty).72 As the representative
of the Indian Government noted during the adoption of the Rome
Statute, “it was odd . . . that the draft adopted a definition of crimes
against humanity with which the representatives of over half of
humanity did not agree. And now we are about to adopt a Statute to
which the Governments who represent two-thirds of humanity
would not be a party.”73
Further, the treaty created new crimes and redefined other
offenses over which it has jurisdiction. This was done without
obtaining the consent of non-party States, yet it is those new and
redefined crimes to which nationals of non-party States swept into
the ICC’s jurisdictional web would have to answer. That, too, is a
significant flaw in the treaty. Additionally, the treaty does away with
various customary international law protections, such as,
longstanding immunities defenses,74 without non-party State input
or consent, yet another significant flaw. The foregoing, however, are

72
73
74

See supra note 28.
Lahiri, supra note 6.
See supra note 14.

34

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 16.2

just a sampling of serious flaws concerning the ICC. The ICC also
suffers from additional, serious procedural and administrative
flaws.75

75
Hopefully, the following examples (coupled with those already
discussed in the accompanying text above) will suffice to establish why the
United States finds the ICC to be an unacceptable court for investigating
and trying U.S. nationals: First, there has been a history of unethical
coaching of prosecution witnesses, see, e.g., HOILE, supra note 48, at xvi
(noting that “the very first witness on the very first day of the ICC’s firstever trial . . . admitted he had been coached in what to say” by an NGO);
Oliver Mathenge, Ruto Wants Bensouda Probed over ICC Witness
Coaching, Sexual Harassment, STAR (May 3, 2016, 5:00 PM),
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/05/03/ruto-wants-bensouda-probedover-icc-witness-coaching-sexual-harassment_c1343956 (claiming the
continuance of the improper and unethical practice of coaching prosecution
witnesses by NGOs under the current Chief Prosecutor); Second,
unqualified judges have been appointed, see, e.g., T. MARKUS FUNK,
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
74 (2nd ed. 2015) (noting that “there in fact is no general requirement that
ICC judges have any practical in-court experience or, for that matter, even
have attended law school or obtained a law degree”); Afua Hirsch, System
for Appointing Judges ‘Undermining International Courts’: Politicised
Voting and a Lack of Transparency Has Led to Unqualified Judges Taking
Key Positions, Study Claims, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2010, 2:08 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2010/sep/08/law-international-courtjustice-legal (“Unqualified judges, in some cases with no expertise on
international law and in one case no legal qualifications, have been
appointed to key positions because of highly politicised voting systems and
a lack of transparency.”); and Third, the treaty includes measures penalizing
the defense, see, e.g., GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 536 (4th ed. 2012) (concluding that
“[t]he worst feature of the Rome Statute is that it makes no provision for the
defence”); id. at 545 (noting that “[u]nnecessarily, and indeed oppressively,
the prosecution is [] given a right of appeal against an acquittal, and the
defendant may even be imprisoned pending such an appeal”); id. at 551
(noting that “[a]t the ICC there have been genuine and serious problems in
working out a disclosure regime which is fair to the defence”). There are
additional problems as well. See generally HOILE, supra note 48.
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In June 2010 and December 2017, the Assembly of States
Parties adopted two amendments to Article 8.76 Despite Article
121(5)’s language that allows only States Parties to reject ICC
jurisdiction over their nationals with respect to amended crimes, the
amendments extended the exemptions to non-party States as well.77
The language in the two amendments to Article 8 shows a somewhat
bizarre application of the Vienna Convention’s customary rules on
treaty law. Specifically, the Assembly of States Parties allowed the
consent-based application of the treaty for the amendments but not
with respect to accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC itself (which
should be governed by the identical principle of consent). If a nonparty State can reject ICC jurisdiction with respect to the amended
crimes, there is no principled reason why that State should not be
able to reject jurisdiction of the ICC altogether pursuant to the exact
same principle.
The existence of such open and notorious flaws fully justifies
the mistrust of the ICC by the United States and explains the
vigorous pushback by American officials against the ICC and its
efforts to assert jurisdiction over U.S. nationals. Such flaws may
also explain the continuing reluctance of other States to accede to
the Rome Statute as well as the increasing number of States Parties
withdrawing, or threatening to withdraw, from the treaty.

IV. REVIEW & CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR AKANDE’S
ANALYSIS
Professor Akande’s claim that a treaty-based international
criminal court may exercise jurisdiction over nationals of nonconsenting, non-party States is based on faulty reasoning. For
example, he extrapolates from well-established custom applicable
to States and simply concludes that the identical principle would
apply to international criminal courts. His logic is as follows: First,

76

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15bis(4)–(5) & n.5; Res. ICCASP/16/Res.4, at para. 2.
77
Id.
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he claims that ICC jurisdiction is based on the idea of delegated
jurisdiction (we do not dispute this fact, since any tribunal
established by treaty is impotent to act until States Parties delegate
to it the authority they wish it to exercise);78 Second, to support the
idea of “delegation of jurisdiction,” he claims that so-called antiterrorism treaties allow State-to-State “delegation of jurisdiction”
and, therefore, a State’s delegation of jurisdiction to the ICC over
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States is a natural
progression from the same principle (we dispute, first, that such
treaties involve delegation of jurisdiction at all, since all States
possess inherent and equal authority; we further dispute the
conclusion that rules governing horizontal State-to-State relations
similarly apply to vertical sovereign State-to-non-sovereign, treatycreated criminal tribunal relations);79 Third, he claims that, because
consent of the accused’s State of nationality is not required under
the anti-terrorism treaties when a State prosecutes a foreign national,
no consent of the accused’s State of nationality is required in the
ICC’s situation (again, we dispute that horizontal State-to-State
relations automatically apply to vertical State-to-international
criminal tribunal relations);80 and Finally, he claims that there are
many examples of international criminal tribunals trying accused
persons without the consent of the States of their nationality (we
dispute the implication of this statement because many of the
international criminal tribunals to which he refers were created by
the UNSC pursuant to the UN Charter, which enjoys almost
universal accession, thereby making the tribunals consent-based).81
Professor Akande’s foregoing assertions are a mixture of truth and
error. Accordingly, his claims cannot be sustained, and his argument
fails.
While Professor Akande acknowledges that ICC jurisdiction is
not based on universal jurisdiction,82 he nonetheless cites to the
principle of universal jurisdiction in an attempt to buttress his claim

78
See infra Section V.A.1. for a detailed discussion of the
delegation theory.
79
Id.
80
See infra Section V.A.2. for a detailed discussion.
81
See infra Section V.B. for a detailed discussion.
82
Akande, supra note 7, at 623.
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of ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party
States. He writes:
International law permits (or, in certain cases, requires) all
states [i.e., all states in the international community of
nations] to exercise criminal jurisdiction in respect of
certain crimes because those crimes are deemed to be
prejudicial to the interests of the international community
as a whole. States that have no link of territoriality or
nationality to offences which fall within the scope of
universal jurisdiction are permitted to exercise jurisdiction
. . . . The state exercising universal jurisdiction is in effect
acting on behalf of the international community as a whole.
Given all of this, it would be extraordinary and incoherent
if the rule permitting prosecution of crimes against the
collective interest by individual states—acting as agents of
the community—simultaneously prevented those states
[i.e., all states in the international community of nations]
from acting collectively in the prosecution of these
crimes.83

83

Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The language
used in this quoted material indicates that all States have jurisdiction over
some international criminal acts, which is true. When a State exercises its
jurisdiction over such offenses, it does so on its own behalf and can be
viewed as also acting to the benefit of the international community as a
whole. When Professor Akande uses the phrase “those states” in the last
sentence above, he is referring to all States that make up the international
community of nations. We have no objection to the truthfulness of his
statement provided that all States actually agree to act collectively by
creating an international court to act in parallel with national courts, which
clearly have jurisdiction. Where we part company is with Professor
Akande’s inference that creation of an international court by a well-meaning
subset of all States (which the Rome Statute has done) is sufficient in and
of itself to implicate the subset of States that disagrees with the position that
the well-meaning subset of States has agreed upon.
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We generally concur in Professor Akande’s statement of the
law as expressed above with respect to universal crimes, such as
piracy or the slave trade. We would also generally concur in his
statement regarding collective action to the extent that it involves
“all states.” In other words, if “all states” agree to act collectively in
the prosecution of certain crimes, then the institution created to deal
with such offenses would theoretically enjoy the consent of “all
states,” thereby wholly conforming to the consent-based nature of
conventional international law. We must disagree, however, that
States that individually prosecute universal crimes are acting as
“agents” for the community of nations in general. Although
prosecution of universal crimes by an individual State undoubtedly
benefits all nations, “agency” is a concept with a precise legal
meaning. It is defined as a “[r]elation in which one person acts for
or represents another by [the] latter’s authority, either in the
relationship of principal and agent, master and servant, or employer
or proprietor and independent contractor.”84 Further, agency is “the
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”85 Agency
is in effect a transfer of authority to act in a certain way from one
person (or entity) possessing such authority to another person (or
entity) previously without such authority. Yet, because all States
possess inherent and equal authority to prosecute universal offenses,
no State that does so needs another’s permission to so act. No
transfer of authority is involved. Hence, despite a benefit to all
nations, the prosecuting State is no one’s “agent.”86

84

added).

Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis

85
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (AM.
LAW INST. 1958)).
86
This is not to suggest that one State cannot serve as an “agent” for
another State in some circumstances. For example, it is not uncommon for
State A to ask State B to represent State A’s interests in State C, a country
with which State A does not have diplomatic relations. In those
circumstances, State B would be serving as State A’s agent and would be

2020
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With respect to the ICC, “all states” are clearly not involved.
The ICC enjoys the consent of only some States (approximately onethird of “all states”—including three Permanent Members of the UN
Security Council—do not consent). It is well-established that
customary international law recognizes that a State’s criminal courts
may prosecute certain crimes (like piracy, for example) irrespective
of a territorial or nationality linkage to the prosecuting State. Yet,
customary international law does not extend such jurisdiction to an
international criminal court created by a treaty negotiated by some
States. Conventional international law is by definition consentbased.87 If the State of nationality of an accused is not a party to the
treaty creating the international court, there is no consent, and the
court created by such treaty lacks valid jurisdiction over such
accused.88 Moreover, to date, approximately one-third of all States
(representing approximately two-thirds of the world’s population)
reject extending ICC jurisdiction over their nationals, period.
Further, no State Party to the Rome Statute possesses any authority
whatsoever to waive a non-party State’s rights to be free of any and
all association with the ICC. The terms in the Rome Statute that
suggest otherwise89 are ultra vires and void ab initio with respect to

bound by any limitations State A would set on such representation. This is
not the case regarding universal jurisdiction offenses.
87
In reality, to some degree, all international law is consent-based:
[R]ules of international law in general, and the authority of
international institutions in particular, cannot be imposed—either
by treaty or custom—on states that have not consented to them.
Although the consent may be implied in certain circumstances (as
when a new customary rule develops over a long period without
dissent), under no circumstance can consent be dispensed with
altogether.
That, however, is precisely what the ICC states parties have
done in their efforts to incorporate “universality” into the Rome
Statute. Under that instrument, the ICC asserts jurisdiction over
the nationals, including governmental officials, of non-parties.
Such claims are unprecedented and unsupported by any
established doctrine of international law.
Casey & Rivkin, supra note 5, at 64.
88
See also supra note 43.
89
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12(2)(a), 27.
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non-party States since States Parties could only delegate to the ICC
authority they lawfully possessed.
The fact that Professor Akande concludes that such a situation
is “extraordinary and incoherent” does nothing to establish the
legality of his preferred position, to wit, an ICC with broader
jurisdictional reach than customary international law on treaty
application otherwise permits. It is simply an inconvenient fact for
the proponents of broad ICC jurisdiction that Article 12(2)(a) of the
Rome Statute violates both customary international law as well as
the sovereign right of a non-party State (meaning its government,
nationals, territory, and actions) to be free of any and all obligations
of the legal regime established in the Rome Statute. The fact that
noncompliance with the Rome Statute may be anathema to those
who want the Statute’s provisions to apply universally to all States
does not legitimize the aggressive push to expand ICC jurisdiction
to nationals of non-party States in contravention of the
unambiguous, well-established rule of law refuting such authority.
ICC proponents appear to be all too willing to jettison otherwise
unambiguous principles of customary international law in favor of
an “ends-justify-the-means” approach because they cannot
otherwise legitimately or lawfully attain their goals in the face of
firm resistance by non-consenting, non-party States like the United
States.
Yet, the law is the law, and illegal means are illegal means no
matter how one tries to dress them up as something else. Customary
international law and the sovereignty of States support a State’s right
to reject a treaty in toto (save only for any customary international
law included in its terms). When a State rejects a treaty, that State
exempts itself from every provision contrary to custom in such a
treaty.
In the remainder of Professor Akande’s quotation cited above,90
Professor Akande’s choice of words appears to acknowledge the
Achilles heel of his argument. Note how his language changes to
reflect aspirations which sound more in policy rather than in law, to
wit, what the law “should be” as opposed to what the law “is”:

90

See supra note 83.
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The natural assumption, failing the existence of a specific
rule to the contrary, should be that where states are acting
individually to protect collective interests and values, they
are not prohibited, and should rather be encouraged, to
take collective action for the protection of those collective
interests. Thus, the same principle permitting individual
states to prosecute individuals for international crimes, on
the basis of universal jurisdiction and without the consent
of the state of nationality, suggests that those states should
be able to act collectively to achieve the same end. This
may be done by setting up an international tribunal which
exercises the joint authority of those states to prosecute.91
Professor Akande’s policy argument appears to have been
included to reinforce for proponents (and hopefully convince
opponents) that expanded ICC jurisdiction is a good idea and
essentially the same as allowing a State’s criminal court to prosecute
certain offenses. Non-consenting, non-party States like the United
States reject outright—as is their right under customary
international law—the notion that a State’s criminal courts and the
ICC are essentially equivalent. They are in fact different, and they
extend different rights and protections to an accused. To the extent
that States wish to accede to the Rome Statute and its terms and
obligations (save only for any terms and/or obligations that violate
the rights of non-consenting, non-party States), they are free to do
so. But the contrary principle is also true—to the extent that States
wish to reject the Rome Statute and its terms and obligations (save
only for any terms and/or obligations in the treaty that simply restate
already binding customary international law), they are likewise free
to do so.

91

omitted).

Akande, supra note 7, at 626 (emphasis added) (footnote
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V. EVIDENCE PROFESSOR AKANDE CITES TO
SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT IS WHOLLY
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT CUSTOM
HAS DEVELOPED AS HE CLAIMS
Professor Akande cites to a number of examples which he
believes establishes that custom has developed to the point where
international criminal courts like the ICC may indeed lawfully assert
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. The
examples he provides to support his thesis include “anti-terrorism
treaties,” ad hoc international criminal tribunals created by the
UNSC,92 the Nuremberg Tribunal,93 the Special Court for Sierra
Leone,94 the Rhine Navigation Convention of Mannheim,95 the
European Court of Justice,96 and the Caribbean Court of Justice.97
As shown below, his examples fall woefully short of establishing
the fact that a new custom has developed. Not one example he cites
supports his claim that an international criminal court may exercise
jurisdiction without the consent of the accused’s State of nationality,
let alone establish a custom to that effect.

A. A STATE’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER ANTITERRORISM TREATIES IS NOT ANALOGOUS TO THE
ICC’S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION UNDER THE ROME
STATUTE
Professor Akande asserts that “[t]he argument that states may
not delegate their criminal jurisdiction [to the ICC] without the
consent of the state of nationality fails to properly account for the
many treaties by which states delegate their criminal jurisdiction to
other states” without the consent of the State of the accused’s
nationality.98 This argument disregards three key facts. First, under

92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 628–31.
Id. at 627–28.
Id. at 631–32.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 632–33.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 622 (footnote omitted).
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the anti-terrorism treaties, States do not delegate jurisdiction to each
other, let alone to an international criminal tribunal, and, as such, the
jurisdictional regime under the anti-terrorism treaties is
distinguishable from the jurisdictional regime under the Rome
Statute. Second, the anti-terrorism treaties do not bind non-parties;
therefore, non-party States do not have any obligations under the
anti-terrorism treaties—another distinguishing factor. Third, a State
trying a foreign national under an anti-terrorism treaty is not
required to obtain the consent of the accused’s State of nationality
because the trying State’s jurisdiction is established under already
recognized customary international law principles,99 irrespective of
the anti-terrorism treaty being cited. Therefore, the consent of the
accused’s State of nationality under an anti-terrorism treaty has no
similarity to the idea of State consent under the Rome Statute.
The major flaw in Professor Akande’s logic is his presumption
that a State’s trying a national of another State in its domestic courts
without the consent of the accused’s State of nationality (a principle

99
Under customary international law, there are five recognized
means of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign nationals wholly independent
of treaty-based language. The five customary means are: the objective
territorial principle, the nationality principle, the protective principle, the
passive personality principle, and the universality principle. JUSTICE FOR
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 47–48 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds.,
2003) [hereinafter Lattimer & Sands] (Objective territorial jurisdiction
includes “jurisdiction over conduct commenced outside the forum state with
effects inside that state”; protective jurisdiction is jurisdiction “over crimes
committed against the forum state’s particular interests, such as harming its
national security or counterfeiting its currency”; passive personality
jurisdiction is “jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad against a state’s
own nationals”; and universal jurisdiction is “the ability of states to
investigate and prosecute conduct abroad which is not linked to the forum
state by the nationality of the suspect or of the victim or by harm to the
forum state’s own interests.”). The nationality principle permits a country
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over any of its nationals accused of criminal
offenses in another State. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 786–87 (1988). Hence, if any of
these means applies, non-party States would have little reason to complain,
and, if they sought to complain, they could do so by State-to-State
interaction as recognized by customary international law, since none of the
anti-terrorism treaties envisions use of an international criminal tribunal.

44

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 16.2

well-established in customary international law) establishes the fact
that custom has developed to the point where an international
tribunal, created via treaty by some States, may also try a national
of a non-consenting, non-party State. That conclusion is a gross non
sequitur and factually and legally specious.
Note that none of the anti-terrorism treaties “delegates”
jurisdiction to an international tribunal of any description much less
to an international criminal court—the underlying issue for the
United States with respect to the ICC. Instead, in every instance, a
State’s criminal courts exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, nothing
in these treaties even remotely establishes a change in custom
applicable to treaty-based international tribunals like the ICC.
States’ exercise of jurisdiction under the anti-terrorism treaties is
simply not analogous to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.
The United States does not dispute the principle that individual
States have the right to delegate their criminal jurisdiction to a court
like the ICC for their own nationals, nationals of other States Parties,
and nationals of non-party States that consent thereto. The very
purpose of making treaties is to establish rules that govern the
relations of the negotiating States inter se—note, inter se—not visà-vis non-consenting, third States. What the United States disputes
is a claimed, generalized right of a State Party to delegate its
otherwise legitimate criminal jurisdiction over a foreign State’s
national to an international criminal court rejected by the accused’s
State of nationality without the accused’s State’s consent.100

100
Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from the
International Criminal Court, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/protecting-americanconstitutionalism-sovereignty-international-criminal-court/.
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1. The “Extradite or Prosecute” Requirement Under the
Anti-Terrorism Treaties Does Not Constitute Delegation
of One State’s Criminal Jurisdiction to Another State
Professor Akande lays great emphasis on the notion of
delegation of jurisdiction. To delegate is defined as “to transfer
authority from one person to another; to empower one to perform a
task in behalf of another.”101 Delegation, in effect, is giving to
another what he does not already possess, or empowering another to
do that which he could not otherwise do but for such empowerment.
None of the anti-terrorism treaties contains any language that could
mean or suggest that States are empowering other States to act as
their “agents” or “representatives” as would be the case under the
delegation theory. States do not delegate authority to one another in
these circumstances—they are legally equal and possess inherent
authority. As equals, no State possesses more legal authority than
any other State. Hence, delegation of jurisdiction is inapt.
Perhaps an example would be useful here. Let us assume a
national of State A boards an aircraft flagged by State B, commits a
crime on board the aircraft against a national of State C while the
aircraft is in the airspace of State D, following which the aircraft
lands in State E. States A through D (inclusive), may each exercise
jurisdiction over the crime under customary international law102
regardless of whether a treaty exists among them because each State
has an internationally recognized link to the crime, whether by
nationality of the accused, nationality of the victim, nationality of
the aircraft, or because the crime occurred in the respective State’s
airspace. Given the foregoing links which translate into customary
grounds for asserting criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals,
States B, C, and D could each prosecute the accused without having
to obtain consent of State A, the accused’s State of nationality.
Absent a treaty among them directing otherwise, each State, as a
sovereign entity, could likewise decline to prosecute and, under the
facts as set forth, no State would be obligated to extradite the
accused to another State for trial. The only State in the above
scenario that does not appear to have any concrete link to the crime

101
102

Delegate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (6th ed. 1990).
See supra note 99.
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is State E where the accused landed and disembarked. Absent a
treaty directing otherwise or some already existing domestic legal
requirement, State E is not required to do anything.
Now, let us assume that all five States were parties to one of the
anti-terrorism treaties. Turning again to State E, State E would be
obligated to extradite or prosecute the accused—extradite the
accused to States A, B, C, or D, whichever is willing to prosecute,
or take measures to establish jurisdiction to prosecute the accused
under its national laws (assuming such a law did not already exist).
In order to prosecute the accused in its national courts, State E would
probably enact a law (a long-arm statute or a universal jurisdiction
statute) that recognizes the crime covered by the treaty as
prosecutable under its domestic law. Contrary to Professor
Akande’s claim, the anti-terrorism treaties to which he refers do not
give the State of custody (State E, in this example) a “right” to
prosecute. Neither do the treaties require State-to-State delegation
of jurisdiction. Instead, the terms of the treaties, freely entered into
by State E, create an obligation on State E’s part to extradite or
prosecute. Further, by acceding to the respective treaty, State E had
consented to such an obligation!
Professor Akande simply concludes that, despite the absence of
such language in the anti-terrorism treaties, if State E decides to
prosecute, it is prosecuting “on behalf of” other States as opposed to
prosecuting pursuant to its treaty obligations. He erroneously
concludes that there can be only one “explanation” if State E
chooses to prosecute, and that explanation is that State E is acting
under the authority “delegated” by other States. That is simply
untrue. As discussed above, the State that has no link to the crime
and, finding the offender in its territory, would generally have no
jurisdiction or means or interest to prosecute the accused but for the
fact that that State is a treaty member. For that reason, the State has
freely obligated itself to extradite or take measures to establish
jurisdiction and prosecute the accused, or be in violation of treaty
obligations. No “delegation” whatsoever has occurred or is required
among State Parties to the anti-terrorism treaties. Any requirement
to extradite or prosecute flows from the terms of the treaty to which
State E has acceded.
More importantly, Professor Akande gives no example in which
States with custody (like State E in the foregoing example), which
have no link to the crime, have prosecuted the accused pursuant to
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the anti-terrorism treaties. Yet, even if such examples exist, they
would not support the claim that a custom has developed whereby a
treaty-based international criminal court may exercise jurisdiction
over a national of a non-party State without that State’s consent.
Given the foregoing, the anti-terrorism treaties do not provide
evidence that there is a pattern of “delegating” jurisdiction at all,
much less in any way analogous to delegating authority to an
international criminal court, thereby binding non-party States to a
treaty, which is Professor Akande’s claim. State-to-State dealings
occur horizontally between and among legal equals, whereas Stateto-ICC dealings occur vertically between legal unequals—between
the superiors (sovereign States, each possessing inherent authority
to exercise jurisdiction by virtue of being sovereign) and the
inferiors (the ICC and its various component parts which are legally
impotent to act until specific authority is delegated to them by those
who possess such authority, to wit, the States Parties to the Rome
Statute).
We believe that, with respect to the ICC, the States Parties to
the Rome Statute drafted a treaty which purports to delegate more
authority to the court than the States Parties possessed,103 and the
key principle of delegation is that one cannot delegate more
authority than one actually possesses. Further, since the United
States has declined to delegate one scintilla of its sovereign authority
to the ICC, the ICC possesses absolutely no legitimate authority to
exercise against the United States, its nationals, and its interests.

103
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12(2)(a) (allowing
the ICC to try nationals of non-consenting, non-party States without such
States’ consent); id. at art. 27 (allowing the ICC to disregard immunities
defenses found in customary international law without non-party States’
consent). Under such circumstances, to the extent that States Parties
delegate more authority than they possess (which they undoubtedly did
since no State can waive another State’s sovereign rights without consent),
treaty terms that reflect such wrongful delegation are void ab initio.
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2. Consent of an Accused’s State of Nationality is Not
Required When Jurisdiction is Established by Way of the
Five Customary Bases of Jurisdiction, None of Which
Applies to a Treaty-Based International Criminal
Tribunal
Professor Akande’s second argument regarding the antiterrorism treaties is predicated on the following:
The US is a party to many of [the] anti-terrorism treaties
and, like other states, has initiated domestic prosecutions
under these treaties, of non-party nationals, without
seeking the consent of the state of nationality . . . . This
[Professor Akande believes] is significant evidence that no
state has hitherto taken the view that states may not
delegate their jurisdiction to other states without the
consent of the state of nationality.104
Even if one were to believe that States “delegate” jurisdiction
to other States under the anti-terrorism treaties, which the facts and
treaty language belie,105 Professor Akande has given no examples
indicating that States in fact prosecute the accused under those
circumstances. Further, if such prosecutions do occur, that would
only provide an example that States prosecute foreigners without the
consent of the State of nationality which, in itself, would lend no
support for Professor Akande’s thesis that a treaty-based
international tribunal may also exercise jurisdiction over nationals
of non-consenting, non-party States. Customary international law

104

Akande, supra note 7, at 624.
See Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 704
U.N.T.S. 219 (186 Member States); Hague Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 860
U.N.T.S. 105 (185 Member States); Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened
for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (188 Member States).
105
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that governs State-to-State interactions is not ipso facto applicable
to interactions between other international actors as Professor
Akande appears to presume.
An important point to keep in mind is that recourse to national
criminal courts to try foreigners differs significantly from recourse
to an international criminal court created by a treaty that a significant
number of important States has rejected.106 As discussed above,

106
And not because an international court has greater prestige, as
Professor Akande suggests. Akande, supra note 7, at 625. In fact, we assert
that international courts are significantly less prestigious and trustworthy
because they are unaccountable and are more susceptible to political
manipulation than courts in developed nations committed to the rule of law,
such as the United States. A case in point should hopefully suffice to
demonstrate why the United States is rightly skeptical of international
courts. In our view, the so-called Wall Case advisory opinion by the ICJ is
such an example. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131 (Jul. 9),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00EN.pdf. In that advisory opinion, the Court concluded that Israel was not
justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter to build a barrier to stop
infiltration of terrorists and suicide bombers into Jewish communities from
communities in the so-called “West Bank” because Israel was not defending
itself against a “State.” Id. ¶ 139. What a ludicrous conclusion. Nowhere in
the text of Article 51 does it state that the inherent right to self-defense is
limited to instances involving “another State,” although that is the
conclusion of the ICJ. See id. (“Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the
existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by
one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the
attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State . . . . Consequently, the
Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.”
(emphasis added)). What rule or principle of international law forbids the
building of a wall except when aimed at another State? Where is such a rule
found either in custom or convention? That rule was simply made up out of
whole cloth to condemn Israel’s actions. It totally (and inexplicably)
disregards defending against non-State actors who may threaten a State. The
opinion clearly reveals the questionable legal reasoning of too many
international judges, the lack of balance in considering evidence (or even
being willing to deal with an issue when one side declines to provide
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customary international law generally accepts the principle that
foreign nationals may legitimately be tried in the domestic criminal
courts of the State in which the criminal act is alleged to have been
committed (or have been brought before such State’s criminal courts
via a long-arm jurisdictional principle recognized in customary
international law, none of which requires consent by an accused’s
State of nationality107). The United States does not dispute this.108
Just as the United States frequently tries foreign nationals in U.S.
domestic courts for criminal acts, comity dictates that the United

evidence as is its right vis-à-vis non-binding advisory opinions), and that
too many international jurists apparently cannot resist interjecting their
political views into their decisions. See, e.g., Declaration of Judge
Buergenthal, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 131, ¶ 3 (Jul.
9) https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-0105-EN.pdf (finding opinion lacks credibility because the Court failed to
examine “Israel’s legitimate right of self-defence [as well as its] military
necessity and security needs”); id. ¶ 5 (calling “legally dubious” the Court’s
conclusion that Israel’s right to self-defence was “not applicable in the
present case”); id. ¶ 7 (criticizing the Court for “barely address[ing] the
summaries of Israel’s position . . . which contradict or cast doubt on the
material the Court claims to rely on”); and id. ¶ 8 (criticizing the Court for
failing to address Israeli arguments). This Advisory Opinion nonetheless
continues to be cited as if it were well-reasoned and authoritative, and it is
continually cited as a bludgeon against Israeli attempts to protect its citizens
from anti-Israel terrorist groups. That is disgraceful, reflects poorly on
international courts, and explains why the United States, among others,
fundamentally distrusts such courts and, thus, chooses to interact with them
as little as possible.
107
See supra note 99.
108
Admittedly, such a custom can be modified by agreement
between States. A common example of such an agreement is embodied in
the so-called Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), which govern the legal
presence of foreign military forces in a State’s territory and which determine
under what circumstances and for which offenses the host nation retains
jurisdiction over foreign national lawbreakers on its soil, and under what
circumstances and for which offenses the sending nation must try the
alleged lawbreakers.
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States recognize the same customary right for other States vis-à-vis
U.S. nationals. Should a dispute arise about the trial or treatment of
an accused U.S. national in a foreign State’s court (or vice versa),
State-to-State talks can be initiated in an attempt to resolve it. Such
State-to-State interactions are well-established and understood, and
are generally governed by customary international law.109 Hence,
the United States does not object per se to a foreign court trying an
American national without obtaining prior American consent to do
so. When the issue involves a national of one State being tried in
another State, the law is well-established in custom, and the
procedures are well-known and tried. The same cannot be said with
respect to a court like the ICC which not only claims the right to
investigate and try non-party State nationals, but also the right to
evaluate whether the non-party State’s judicial system is operating
to the standard deemed acceptable by ICC officials (via the Rome
Statute principle of complementarity110). Both of these claimed
“rights” violate the sovereignty of third-party States as well as
customary international law, and no longstanding procedures exist
for the State of nationality to intervene with an international criminal
court as exists between States. To whom would the sovereign of an
objecting third-party State appeal on behalf of its nationals in the
case of alleged or actual wrongdoing by the ICC? The ICC
Prosecutor is answerable to no foreign sovereign and need not deal
with an objecting third-party sovereign, rendering that sovereign

109

The same cannot be said about a non-party State dealing with
officials of an international court whose jurisdiction the non-party State has
not accepted. There are no recognized, agreed-to channels of interaction
between officials of a non-party State and officials of an international court
like the ICC (created by other States) whose jurisdiction the non-party State
has not accepted.
110
Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 1 (stating that the ICC
jurisdiction “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”).
See also China’s Attitude Towards the ICC, supra note 6 (noting China’s
objection that the ICC’s “jurisdiction is not based on the principle of
voluntary acceptance” and that “complementarity gives the ICC the power
to judge whether a state is able or willing to conduct proper trials of its own
nationals”).
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impotent to fulfill its sovereign duty vis-à-vis its own nationals
(absent exercise of more extreme measures). In our view, that is a
significant violation of a State’s sovereign rights which hampers its
ability to protect the interests of its nationals.
Let us now turn to the three U.S. court cases Professor Akande
cites. Each case involves prosecution of a foreign national for, inter
alia, a terrorism offense enumerated in one of the anti-terrorism
treaties. Contrary to Professor Akande’s assertion, in none of the
three cases did the U.S. try the accused based on jurisdiction
delegated by another State.
To be lawfully tried in a U.S. court, the court must possess both
jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the offense. What
Professor Akande fails to acknowledge in United States v. Yunis111
(and in the other two cases for that matter) is the fact that customary
international law recognizes multiple ways for a State to establish
lawful jurisdiction over the person without having to obtain the
consent of the accused’s State of nationality.112 That is doubtless
why Professor Akande discovered that no States of nationality have
protested with respect to “consent” under the anti-terrorism treaties;
the means used to obtain jurisdiction over the accused were lawful
under customary international law and were recognized as such by
the accused’s State of nationality.
In Yunis, for example, the court cited, inter alia, the “universal
principle” and the “passive personality principle”113 from customary
international law to justify the accused’s presence before the court.
Those principles are well-recognized in customary international law
and independently establish personal jurisdiction without having to
resort to the terms of an otherwise applicable treaty.

111

924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
See supra note 99. The five customary sources of establishing
jurisdiction do not apply to international tribunals.
113
924 F.2d 1086 at 1091 (“Under the passive personal [sic]
principle, a state may punish non-nationals for crimes committed against its
nationals outside of its territory, at least where the state has a particularly
strong interest in the crime.”). The court wrongly labelled it the “passive
personal principle.”
112
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Hence, to conclude as Professor Akande does that the Yunis
case shows that the United States has supported exercising its
jurisdiction without having to obtain the prior consent of the
accused’s State of nationality, while true, does not establish the
point he sought to make. If the United States can establish a basis
for personal jurisdiction in custom (which binds all States save for
those that were persistent objectors as the custom developed), it has
jurisdiction to proceed irrespective of the consent of the accused’s
State of nationality—and need not seek it. The same is true of other
States with respect to U.S. nationals. Hence, this customary law
principle is recognized and accepted, thereby extinguishing a
legitimate basis to object. Yet, if the accused’s State of nationality
nonetheless objected, it could raise its objections State-to-State, as
is the usual practice.
Further, in Yunis the United States was not transferring the case
to an international criminal court created by a treaty which the
accused’s State of nationality had rejected, which once again is the
basis for the United States’ objection to the Rome Statute and the
ICC. Had the United States sought to do so, perhaps Professor
Akande might have had a point. Additionally, he fails to recognize
that the ICC and other international courts do not have recourse to
the five customary international law means of obtaining personal
jurisdiction enjoyed by States.
Similarly, in United States v. Rezaq114 the United States court
noted that the case fell within “the so-called ‘passive personality
principle’”115 because victim “Scarlett Rogenkamp was a United
States citizen, and there was abundant evidence that she was chosen
as a victim because of her nationality.”116 Hence, no prior consent
from the accused’s State of nationality was required. Additionally,
as in Yunis, the case was not being transferred to an international
court created by other States. Accordingly, it is not similar to the
issue at hand, to wit, whether the ICC, a court created by a sub-set

114
115
116

134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1133.
Id.
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of States via the Rome Statute, can assert any form of jurisdiction
over American nationals whose State of nationality, the United
States, has rejected the Rome Statute as is its right under customary
international law. Again, this case does not support Professor
Akande’s thesis.
In United States v. Yousef,117 the third U.S. case Professor
Akande cites, the court noted that jurisdiction could be asserted by
the United States pursuant to the “protective principle” of customary
international law.118 As such, no prior consent by the accused’s
States of nationality was required. And, once again, the case was not
being transferred to an international court created by other States.
None of the three U.S. cases to which Professor Akande refers
establishes that the United States has consented to the principle that
Professor Akande claims it has. No prior consent was necessary or
sought by the United States because no prior consent was required
under the five well-recognized bases of obtaining personal
jurisdiction under customary international law.119 If no consent was
required by applicable customary international law or by the terms
of a treaty to which the United States had acceded, one cannot
simply assume what Professor Akande has assumed, to wit, that the
United States has, in fact, acquiesced by practice in the claims
Professor Akande has made. Key here regarding the ICC is the fact
that the United States is objecting to having the terms of a treaty
that it has rejected applied to its nationals, and none of the U.S.
cases cited by Professor Akande involved an international court at
all, much less an international court created by a treaty which the
accused’s States of nationality had rejected. These cases are inapt
and do not support Professor Akande’s thesis.

117

327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 91–92 (finding that “contrary to Yousef’s claims, customary
international law does provide a substantial basis for jurisdiction by the
United States over each of these counts, although not (as the District Court
held) under the universality principle.” (emphasis in original)).
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As such, exercise of jurisdiction by sovereign States under the
anti-terrorism treaties is clearly distinguishable from exercise of
jurisdiction by the ICC and does not constitute “evidence of
extensive practice of states delegating part of their criminal
jurisdiction over non-nationals either to other states or to tribunals
created by international agreements.”120 To assert otherwise has
absolutely no basis in law or common sense.

B. OTHER INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS PURPORTED TO
HAVE EXERCISED JURISDICTION WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED’S STATE OF NATIONALITY
Professor Akande points to other international tribunals in
support of his thesis. However, his examples utterly fail to establish
that any prior international criminal tribunal has exercised
jurisdiction over an accused without the consent of his State of
nationality, let alone the development of a custom to that effect.

1. The Nuremberg Tribunal
Although Professor Akande initially raised the Nuremberg
Tribunal as a possible source of support for his views, he quickly
concluded that “one cannot rely with any certainty on the
Nuremberg Tribunal as a precedent for delegation without the
consent of the state of nationality.”121 We agree that the Nuremberg
Tribunal does not support his argument vis-à-vis international
criminal courts, primarily because the four victorious allied powers
were exercising the sovereign powers of Germany by virtue of
Germany’s unconditional surrender in World War II. Hence, the
Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction was, in effect, based on the
consent of the State of nationality.122

120
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Id. at 627.
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2. The International Criminal Tribunals for Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR)
Next, Professor Akande refers to the ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as “precedents”
of “extensive practice of states delegating part of their criminal
jurisdiction over non-nationals . . . to tribunals created by
international agreements.”123 Recall that the U.S. objection to the
ICC is predicated on the fact that the ICC was created by a treaty
rejected by the United States. Both UN tribunals were created by
UNSC resolutions124 as subsidiary organs of the UNSC in the
exercise of its Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter.125
Professor Akande admits that almost all States are members of the
UN and, as such, have given consent to the terms of the UN Charter,
which includes the UNSC’s authority to establish international
criminal tribunals.126 Accordingly, under the UN Charter, all
Member States have consented to the UNSC’s authority to create ad
hoc international tribunals and/or refer cases to international
tribunals (like the ICC). Consequently, the UNSC’s creating ad hoc
international tribunals for prosecution of crimes or making referrals
to the ICC merely confirms the consent-based nature of such
tribunals and is inapt—without more—to prove that nationals of
non-party States can be tried by those tribunals without the prior
consent of their State of nationality. To establish his point, Professor
Akande would need to cite to a widespread and significant number
of actual instances where jurisdiction was exercised by such
international tribunals without the consent of, or despite the
objection by, the non-party State to the UN Charter. In other words,
to establish that custom has developed as he claims, Professor
Akande would need to produce evidence that non-party States

123
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Id. at 628, 633.
S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 403, 407 (6th ed.

2008).

126

Akande, supra note 7, at 628.

2020

ICC JURISDICTION OVER NON-PARTY NATIONALS:
REFUTING PROFESSOR DAPO AKANDE

57

acquiesced in such jurisdiction over their nationals because they
believed that they had a legal obligation to do so.
Professor Akande fails to meet the burden of proof. He cites to
only one case concerning ad hoc UN-created tribunals to support his
conclusion of widespread practice of international tribunals trying
nationals of non-party States without their consent. And the facts of
that case are considerably muddled. He asserts that, at least in the
case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),127 it can be
argued that the FRY was not a member of the UN when its nationals
were compelled to appear before the ICTY.128 While some States
admittedly did not consider the FRY to be a member of the UN,129
FRY officials maintained the opposite, and the ICTY held that the
FRY was a UN member.130 Hence, regardless of whether the FRY
was an actual, lawful member of the UN at the time, it apparently
considered itself to be a UN member and thereby bound to submit
to the jurisdiction of the ICTY. That would explain why no serious
complaints as to jurisdiction of the ICTY were raised. Moreover, no
matter on which side of the issue one falls (to wit, that the FRY was
or was not a UN member), one disputed case by itself is insufficient
precedent to support development of a custom, especially since the
only State with a colorable basis to object to jurisdiction by the
ICTY considered itself bound to the decision of the UNSC and
therefore with no lawful basis to object. Hence, the UN-created

127
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is the name adopted
by one of the States that emerged from the breakup of Yugoslavia. The FRY
was composed of Serbia and Montenegro. See Serbia and Montenegro,
NATIONS
ONLINE,
https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/serbia_
montenegro.htm (“The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro
declared a new ‘Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ in 1992.”); Profile: Serbia
and Montenegro, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_
profiles/1039269.stm (last updated Jun. 5, 2006) (“Serbia and Montenegro
together formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1992 and
2003,” then known as the “Union of Serbia and Montenegro” until 2006,
when the two nations separated.).
128
Akande, supra note 7, at 628–29.
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Id. at 629 & n.61.
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tribunals cited by Professor Akande fail to support his argument for
precedent supporting the ICC’s expansionist reach to encompass
nationals of non-party States.

3. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created
pursuant to an agreement between the UN Security Council and
Sierra Leone.131 As is clear, Sierra Leone consented to the court’s
jurisdiction by becoming a party to the agreement that established
the court. Professor Akande begins his argument by noting that
“[t]here is nothing in the Court’s Statute that limits the jurisdiction
of the Court to nationals of Sierra Leone.”132 Be that as it may, the
absence of limiting words in the statute vis-à-vis jurisdiction of the
court to nationals of Sierra Leone is significantly different from a
treaty provision that expressly extends jurisdiction to nationals of
non-party States (as does Article 12(2)(a) in the Rome Statute).
Absent an explicit explanation as to why no limiting language was
included in the agreement creating the Special Court, its omission
could have been either an intentional decision because States
generally knew that under customary international law that
agreement did not apply to them or simply an oversight. With
respect to the Rome Statute, we know that extended jurisdiction to
reach non-party State nationals was intentional by the States that
agreed to it.133 Nevertheless, since we do not know whether it was
intentional to exclude limiting language in the Sierra Leone

131
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
Sierra Leone-U.N., Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137. Despite the fact that
the SCSL was constituted in a different manner than the ICTY and ICTR, it
was nonetheless constituted pursuant to UN Security Council resolution
and, hence, appears to be simply an additional variant of UN-created
international criminal tribunals. As a UN member, having one’s nationals
be subject to jurisdiction of a court created (albeit indirectly) by the UN
Security Council does not support Professor Akande’s thesis of extending
jurisdiction over nationals of non-party States without their consent.
132
Akande, supra note 7, at 631 (emphasis added).
133
See Scheffer Testimony, supra note 20, at 14 (“But as the
jurisdiction provision is now framed, it purports to extend jurisdiction over
non-party states for the same new or amended crimes.”).
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agreement, we cannot simply assume that silence in the Sierra Leone
agreement supports Professor Akande’s assumption that the court
was free to exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting,
non-party States or that non-consenting States would have no lawful
basis upon which to object if expanding the court’s jurisdiction were
attempted. Moreover, even if the omission had been intended to
assert jurisdiction over non-nationals of Sierra Leone, absent a
number of cases where non-Sierra Leone nationals were tried and
their States of nationality did not complain due to the alleged
developed custom, we cannot draw any meaningful conclusion from
this example.
The sole example that Professor Akande does cite in support of
his argument about developing custom is the Special Court’s trial of
Liberia’s Head of State, despite the fact that Liberia was not a party
to the agreement that created the court. It is immaterial that the
SCSL was constituted under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter and not
under Chapter VII, since it was nonetheless constituted by the UN
Security Council and, hence, was simply an additional variant of
UNSC-created international criminal tribunals.134 Accordingly,
since most States (including Liberia) are members of the United
Nations their membership constitutes their consent to the provisions
of such UNSC-created international tribunals. Accordingly,
jurisdiction of the SCSL is consensual vis-à-vis UN Member States.
Nonetheless, contrary to Professor Akande’s assertions, Liberia did
in fact object (when Charles Taylor was still in power) on the
grounds that it was not a party to the agreement as well as that Taylor
enjoyed immunity as the Head of State.135 Only once Taylor was
ousted from power did Liberia fully support the trial before the
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See supra note 124.
Press Release, International Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to
the International Court of Justice in a Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning
an International Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Against the Liberian President, Press Release No. 2003/26 (Aug. 5, 2003),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/0/000-20030805-PRE-01-00EN.pdf. See also S.C. Res. 1315, 2–3 (Aug. 14, 2000).
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court.136 This suggests a political motive that calls into question any
claim that the government of Liberia was complying because of a
recognized “custom.”

4. The Rhine Navigation Convention of Mannheim
As with all the treaties and tribunals discussed above,
jurisdiction under the Rhine Navigation Convention (Mannheim
Convention) is also not analogous to the Rome Statute’s nonconsent-based regime. First, note that the “Central Commission for
Navigation on the Rhine is empowered to act as a court of appeal
from decisions of national courts in criminal and civil cases
concerning Rhine shipping,”137 not as an international criminal trial
court. Second, the Mannheim Commission possesses no inherent
jurisdiction over crimes under international law. Third, trials would
still be held in a State’s domestic courts, a recognized practice
sanctioned by customary international law to which no consent by
the accused’s State of nationality is required.
Professor Akande notes that “[s]ome of the cases before the
Central Commission have involved nationals of states not party to
the Mannheim Convention and these states have not objected to this
exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals.”138 Yet, he provides not
one actual case for the reader to review. Instead, he simply cites to
a “[t]elephone conversation” with a “Mr Bour, Registrar of the
Appeals Chamber of the Central Commission,”139 to support his
assertion. We do not question Professor Akande’s veracity
regarding his having obtained such assurances via a conversation
with the Appeals Chamber Registrar, but simply referring to “some”
cases cited by an otherwise unknown official, without providing for
independent review even a single case is wholly insufficient to
establish the claim that a custom has developed. Citing to the

136
Nigeria to Hand Over Liberia’s Taylor for Trial, NPR (Mar. 25,
2006), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5301534.
137
Akande, supra note 7, at 632 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
138
Id. (footnote omitted). The lack of objection by a State proves
nothing. One would have to know the reason for the lack of objection to be
able to draw any conclusion.
139
Id. at n.81.
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Mannheim Commission’s Central Commission added nothing to his
argument. It certainly does nothing to establish that custom now
permits a court like the ICC to extend its jurisdiction to nationals of
non-consenting, non-party States.

5. The European Communities Treaty
Professor Akande next cites the example of Article 234 of the
European Communities Treaty, under which cases before national
courts of European Council (EC) States may be referred to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).140 He claims that “[s]ome of the
criminal proceedings in which the ECJ has participated under the
preliminary reference procedure have involved persons that are not
nationals of EC Member States.”141 First, even if this claim were
true, Professor Akande cites to only one “criminal proceeding” not
“some criminal proceedings,” which is unfortunate if he wishes to
nail down his point.142
Second, and more importantly, the case before the ECJ that he
cited has no relevance to the point Professor Akande attempted to
make, i.e., that there are sufficient examples in which international
criminal tribunals have exercised jurisdiction over nationals of nonconsenting, non-party States. The case he cited involved a request
by Germany for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article
54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of
June 14, 1985 (CISA), which prohibits Schengen States from trying
anyone who has already been tried by one Schengen State for the
same crime.143
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Id. at 633.
142
Id. at n.88.
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The case Professor Akande cited was a dispute between
Germany and the Netherlands (both parties to the CISA) concerning
whether Germany could prosecute a Turkish national who had
already faced criminal proceedings for the identical crime in the
Netherlands. The ECJ was not prosecuting the Turkish national or
dealing with him directly at all, nor had Germany or the Netherlands
“delegated” jurisdiction over the Turkish national to the ECJ.144 The
fact that the case involved a Turkish national was wholly tangential
to the issue before the ECJ. Had the ECJ ultimately decided that
Germany could indeed try the Turkish national, even then it would
have been a domestic criminal court in Germany which would be
trying him, not the ECJ. Hence, the ECJ’s role was simply to
interpret Article 54 of the CISA that prohibits double jeopardy. The
ECJ found against Germany and that ended the case. Once again,
Professor Akande’s example was wholly inapt and did not provide
any evidence in support of extended jurisdiction of the ICC over
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States to the Rome Statute.

6. The Caribbean Court of Justice
The last tribunal Professor Akande cites to support his thesis is
the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). He notes that “the CCJ is
empowered to decide on civil and criminal appeals from the courts
of the member states.”145 As in the cases of the Rhine Navigation
Convention and the European Communities Treaty, the CCJ only
has appellate jurisdiction over cases from Member States’ domestic
courts. Interestingly, Professor Akande states that, “[s]ince the CCJ
will be exercising a jurisdiction which otherwise belongs to the
member states, it may deal with cases involving nationals of nonmember states including those cases where jurisdiction is exercised
on the basis of universal jurisdiction.”146 Since Professor Akande
cited no specific CCJ case, his statement seems to imply that the
CCJ has not yet heard a case involving a national of a non-

Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders art.
54, Jun. 19, 1990, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 43.
144
See Case C-187/01, supra note 143, ¶¶ 16–18.
145
Akande, supra note 7, at 633 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
146
Id. (emphasis added).
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consenting, non-party State to the treaty that established the court.
If that is the case, then citing to the CCJ does nothing to support
Professor Akande’s claim that custom has already developed to
permit an international criminal court like the ICC to exercise its
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States like
the United States. If the court has actually heard cases involving
nationals of non-party States, Professor Akande should have cited
them so that they can be reviewed to determine if they are germane
to the issue at hand. As it now stands, he has established nothing in
support of his thesis vis-à-vis the ICC by citing to the CCJ.

CONCLUSION
Proponents of broad ICC jurisdiction like Professor Akande
support the notion that the ICC is allowed to investigate and try
nationals of non-consenting, non-party States in certain
circumstances.147 Since customary international law maintains that
“[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State
without its consent,”148 such proponents must establish either that a
State and its nationals are separate entities that can be treated
differently under international law or that an internationally
recognized custom has in fact developed that permits an
international criminal court like the ICC to act without a third State’s
consent or both. Professor Akande fails to establish any of the
foregoing.
The argument that States and their nationals are separable is
specious. All State actions are inseparable from a State’s nationals.
No State qua State can act in any way; only its nationals can act. No
State qua State can commit crimes; only its nationals can commit
crimes. No State qua State can be tried and punished; only its
nationals can be tried and punished. To argue as many do that the
ICC “punishes individuals, not States,” although literally true, is a
wholly meaningless statement in fact, since it constitutes an easily
refuted straw man argument. Only real persons can be punished
pursuant to law. Accordingly, the argument that the ICC may try

147
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12(2)(a). See also, Akande,
supra note 7.
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Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 34.
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individuals from non-consenting, non-party States because
individuals are distinct from their States of nationality is simply a
contrived argument used to circumvent well-established, contrary,
customary international law principles that limit the ICC’s
jurisdictional reach.
Professor Akande has cited to a myriad of examples—including
various treaties, international tribunals, and U.S. court cases—that
he claims prove that custom has indeed developed to permit ICC
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States. Our
analysis shows that none of his examples is apt, and many suggest
the very opposite of what he claims. No custom has developed that
allows an international criminal court like the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States.
When one-third of all States (representing two-thirds of the
world’s population) do not agree, that is more than sufficient
evidence against the existence of such an alleged custom. Absent
such custom, any provisions in the Rome Statute that claim that the
ICC has authority over nationals of non-consenting, non-party
States are ipso facto in violation of customary international law. In
that light, any action by the ICC which attempts to assert jurisdiction
over nationals of non-consenting, non-party States is ultra vires and
legally void ab initio. Accordingly, the United States is fully
justified in taking whatever action it deems necessary and prudent
to protect its nationals from any actions taken by the ICC, its
prosecutors, and its chambers of judges vis-à-vis nationals of the
United States. The same also applies to every other non-consenting,
non-party State to the Rome Statute vis-à-vis its nationals.
In conclusion, it is worth repeating what the representative from
India aptly noted when the Rome Statute was adopted: “It is truly
unfortunate that a Statute drafted for an institution to defend the law
should start out straying so sharply from established international
law. Before it tries its first criminal, the ICC would have claimed a
victim of its own—the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.”149 This is precisely what happened, and this is precisely
why the United States so strongly opposes the Rome Statute. Were
officials and agencies of the ICC to pursue legal action against U.S.
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nationals, they would be acting contrary to well-established
customary international law and, thereby, become lawbreakers
themselves. Thwarting such potential lawlessness aimed against
U.S. nationals justifies a robust American response.

